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Abstract
In the software industry, commercial open-source software vendors have recognized that providing ser-
vices to help businesses derive greater value in the implementation of open-source based systems can
be a proﬁtable business model. Moreover, society greatly beneﬁts when software originators choose an
open-source development strategy, as their products become widely available, readily customizable, and
open to community contributions. In this study, we present an economic model to study how software
licensing attributes aﬀect a software originator’s decisions, aiming to provide policy makers with insights
into how welfare-improving open-source outcomes can be incentivized. We show that when a competing
contributor is apt at reaping the beneﬁts of software development investment, a less restrictive open
source license (e.g., BSD style) can improve welfare. On the other hand, when the originator is better
at leveraging investment and service costs are high, a more restrictive license (e.g., GPL style) can be
best for social welfare, even when a contributor can cost eﬃciently develop the software.
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1 Introduction
Open-source software (OSS) has assumed an increasing role in the operations of businesses and govern-
ments. Surveying organizations with either 500 or more employees or revenues in excess of $500 million,
the Linux Foundation found that the use of Linux for mission-critical workloads has increased from 60%
in 2010 to 73% in 2012 (Linux Foundation 2013). Broadly speaking, businesses indicate that the improved
qualities of OSS over the years have now made OSS preferable to proprietary alternatives in many im-
plementation contexts (Noyes 2014). In the public sector, the US Department of Defense has advocated
OSS by formalizing their position in the plan, Open Technology Development, which makes openness a
priority for both internally developed and externally acquired software (Herz et al. 2006). The UK govern-
ment recently also indicated a clear preference for OSS in their Government Service Design Manual (Glick
2013). Increasingly, governments have realized that migration to OSS enables a shift in IT “spend” from
proprietary products to professional services (Herz et al. 2006).
OSS quality beneﬁts from the eﬀorts and investments of both originators and others who contribute to
its development. As an executive of the YMCA states, “Open source software maintains its high quality
by empowering a large number of users from diverse backgrounds with unique perspectives to make frequent
updates to improve the value and ﬂexibility of the code” (Paulnock 2016). Development eﬀorts to improve
OSS quality are typically distributed across various, but necessary activities. Ibrahim Haddad, head of
the open source innovation group at Samsung Research America suggests that OSS allows Samsung “to
concentrate on aspects of product development where the company can actually distinguish itself ” (King
2014). In a similar vein, Red Hat’s CEO James Whitehurst indicates, “So the innovation, or the original
feature development, happens in the open source community. But all of the downstream sustaining engi-
neering, the patching, all of that’s what we do” (Vanian 2016). The open nature of OSS is a mechanism
that empowers contributors to signiﬁcantly increase software quality through updates, patches, and new
features, by distributing the cost of development across all contributors who directly beneﬁt from the soft-
ware’s existence (Lakshminarayanan 2014, Columbus 2016). Many of these strategic contributors leverage
their investments and established expertise by oﬀering professional services.
In fact, the provision of value-added services has been the primary source of revenue for commercial
OSS.1 Today, Red Hat generates over $1 billion in revenues for subscription-based support services driven
mostly by its two ﬂagship products: Red Hat Enterprise Linux and JBoss (McMillan 2012). Cloudera,
who provides an open-source distribution of Apache Hadoop called CDH, invests heavily in the open-source
projects composing CDH and similarly relies on the services market to generate revenues. Cloudera recently
was backed by Intel with a $740 million investment to support its revenue goals (Cohan 2013, Clark 2014).
1See, e.g., August et al. (2013) for a discussion of integration, support, and consulting services.
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These examples underscore how high-quality software alone often does not beneﬁt an organization unless
it is suﬃciently integrated with business processes to generate value. For organizations to achieve such
higher value-added implementations, they require services and it is the ﬁrms who have developed extensive
expertise that are in the best position to help, as is the case for Red Hat and Cloudera in their respective
markets. While there are many ﬁrms who could also provide basic support and services for Linux and
Apache Hadoop, the quality associated with obtaining services from ﬁrms such as Red Hat and Cloudera
is considerably higher due to their substantial investments in developing this expertise.
With the services market, ﬁrms have an economically viable business model that can justify investments
in the development of OSS, even though the software itself is essentially available for free. For a software
originator, an important advantage of pursuing an open-source path is that the quality of its OSS product
leverages eﬀort investments from the community, which in turn increases the value derived by its consumers
on service contracts. However, some contributors to OSS can also be motivated to invest in development in
an eﬀort to gain expertise and compete for these service contracts.2 Thus, a software originator going open
source faces a trade-oﬀ between an increase in quality of software and services by leveraging community
contributions and an increase in services market competition from these extrinsically-motivated contrib-
utors as well as the many providers of basic services packages. Examples of strategic contributors who
invest eﬀort and compete for OSS service contracts include: Shadow-Soft (JBoss), Synolia (SugarCRM),
Bista Solutions (OpenERP), and Hortonworks (Hadoop)3. On the other hand, a software originator could
simply pursue a more traditional, proprietary approach where it does not directly beneﬁt from the eﬀorts
of third-party developers because of the closedness of the source code, but it can generate revenues by
selling copies of the software at a positive price.
From a social perspective, however, there are several beneﬁts associated with a software originator
choosing the open-source path. First, the broader participation in software development that characterizes
OSS can boost quality signiﬁcantly while keeping development costs relatively low, distributed costs being
more eﬃciently incurred (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991). Second, when active contributors to OSS invest in
development and expertise, there is greater competition in the services market which can also be beneﬁcial
to consumers. Third, in contrast to proprietary software, an originator of OSS does not (practically) have
the ability to charge for the software itself, given that it is open and freely downloadable. This additional
pricing power retained by a proprietary originator has a negative eﬀect on both consumer surplus and
the incentives of potential service providers. Taken altogether, there can be gainful opportunities to
substantially increase social welfare if open-source outcomes are encouraged to prevail in certain software
2In some cases, contributors to OSS can be large, cost-eﬃcient ﬁrms such as HP and IBM. HP has over 2,500 developers
working on OSS (Hewlett-Packard 2007), and similarly IBM dedicates vast resources to OSS because their global services
divisions generate $58 billion in revenue which exceeds revenues from their software and hardware businesses (IBM 2012).
3The originator in the case of Hadoop is now chief architect of Cloudera which competes in the same space.
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markets. On the other hand, because of the increased competition it faces in the services market, an
originator may have a reduced incentive to invest in development since its return on investment can now
be lower. Its reduced investment can lead to lower quality solutions brought to market if not adequately
compensated by increased contributions from the community. Therefore, despite the promising beneﬁts
associated with OSS, it is critical to understand how the strategic interactions between an OSS originator
and contributor ultimately determine market outcomes.
In this paper, our goal is to present insights into how regulation and policy can provide incentives to help
stimulate open-source outcomes. The primary factor we focus on in this study is OSS licensing. By OSS
licensing, we refer to the terms and conditions that govern an OSS product, generally specifying the rules
by which an end-user or developer of the software can use, modify, and/or redistribute the software. OSS
licenses vary signiﬁcantly in their level of restrictiveness. The most common broad forms of licensing are
GNU GPL (General Public License) and BSD (Berkeley Software Distribution), with GPL being possibly
the most popular license employed (Fishman 2004). GPL is based on the notion of “copyleft”, which
requires that derivative works of the software also adopt the GPL license. Under this license, all code
others develop based on the originator’s software must be made publicly available, including for the use
of the originator. Thus, a GPL-style license is a relatively more restrictive license and gives the originator
higher direct beneﬁt from a contributor’s eﬀorts. An example of this case is Red Hat’s obligatory acceptance
of the GPL (Hillesley 2008).
On the other hand, BSD-style licenses are very permissive, placing minimal restrictions on software
use and redistribution (Rusin 2008). Under such licenses, contributors are not required to make their
code developed based on the originator’s code available to the public, instead permitting contributors to
retain the rights to their modiﬁcations and improvements. Thus, BSD-style licenses are less restrictive,
and the originator’s beneﬁt from others’ contributions is limited relative to that under GPL. PostgreSQL
and the Apache Software Foundation are two prominent adopters of this style of license (Montague 2008).
A number of other licenses lie between these two extremes such as GNU LGPL (Lesser GPL), which eases
restrictions on software that only links to binaries of GPL licensed code (Rusin 2008). JBoss, for instance,
is licensed under the GNU LGPL (see JBoss 2008).
There are advantages and disadvantages for diﬀerent licenses. For example, Stewart et al. (2006)
explore the impact of OSS license choice on user interest by considering users’ perception of the costs and
beneﬁts of using the software as well as perceived risks related to legal uncertainties and enforceability.
Lerner and Tirole (2005b) point to “hijacking” by commercial software contributors/vendors, i.e., outside
contributors utilizing the open software code to develop (and potentially undermine) commercial software
for proﬁt under unrestrictive licenses. Among many other factors, our focus in this paper is on the
economic incentives. More restrictive licenses provide an advantage to OSS originators who can beneﬁt
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from subsequent contributors’ developments. On the other hand, less restrictive licenses can provide
stronger incentives for these contributors to actually make these developments (Fishman 2004). However,
because of the strategic nature of contributions, the way licensing aﬀects investments in equilibrium can be
diﬃcult to ascertain. Given that commercial ﬁrms increasingly invest in and contribute to OSS products,
our goal is exploring and focusing on those issues related to the economic incentives to contribute to an
OSS project.
In that we study open-source software as motivated by the services market, the level of service costs is
relevant to the analysis. By service costs, we refer to the variable costs incurred by ﬁrms when providing
services to customers of the software. These costs can vary considerably depending on the class of software
in question. For example, an enterprise resource planning (ERP) or customer relationship management
(CRM) system integration would require high service costs because it is typically a time-consuming project
involving extensive customization (Hitt et al. 2002). On the other hand, supporting a MySQL implemen-
tation as part of an application server stack would involve lower service costs, and providing training and
support for productivity tools such as OpenOﬃce would be even less costly to the provider.
In this paper, we formulate a model to study how service costs and OSS licensing attributes aﬀect a
software originator’s decision to pursue an open-source development strategy. To develop the originator’s
choice problem, our model captures the economic incentives of open-source contributors who also compete
in the services market and whose strategic eﬀort investment can be seen as both complementary and
competitive. Using this model, we study the eﬀects of licensing on the incentives of both the originator and
subsequent contributor to invest in the development of OSS. Because whether open-source or proprietary
outcomes are realized can greatly impact the total value generated by software to society, we examine
welfare considerations in this complex production and service environment and study policy implications
for regulators.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant literature. In Section 3,
we formally present the model. Section 4 presents the equilibrium consumer market structure and prices,
and studies the originator’s selection of open-source license restrictiveness and its implications on welfare
and policy. Section 6 oﬀers our concluding remarks. All proofs and technical equilibrium derivations are
given in the Online Supplement.
2 Literature Review
The primary contribution of this paper is its examination of how [i] open-source software licensing impacts
the incentives of [ii] proﬁt-motivated OSS contributors operating in the services market, thereby aﬀecting
an OSS originator’s [iii] decision to pursue a proprietary or OSS strategy. Our paper is the ﬁrst to inte-
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grate these three facets into a single model that facilitates an understanding of the role of OSS licensing
in enterprise software markets which tend to be driven by services. August et al. (2013) is the ﬁrst paper
to study the source code decision while including contributors with extrinsic motivations in the services
market who make endogenous investments toward the development of the OSS product and attainment
of service-related expertise (i.e., facets [ii] and [iii]). Therefore, we build upon August et al. (2013) to
formally examine how OSS licensing (facet [i]) interacts with participants’ investments in OSS and sub-
sequently characterize varying parameter regions under which permissive and restrictive licensing schemes
can ultimately be beneﬁcial to social welfare.
August et al. (2013) provides a discussion of literature related to facets [ii] and [iii]. For a deeper
exploration of these two facets, we direct the reader to that discussion as well as the following papers:
those that model extrinsically motivated OSS ﬁrms (see, e.g., Sen 2007, Kumar et al. 2011, August et al.
2013) stem from a broader literature on the economic incentives of open-source developers (see, e.g., Lerner
and Tirole 2002, Hars and Ou 2002, Lerner and Tirole 2005a, von Krogh and von Hippel 2006, Roberts
et al. 2006, Iansiti and Richards 2006, Mehra et al. 2011, Mehra and Mookerjee 2012, Von Krogh et al.
2012). There is also a growing body of work that studies competition between open-source and proprietary
ﬁrms (see, e.g., Gaudeul 2004a, Bessen 2006, Casadesus-Masanell and Ghemawat 2006, Sen 2007, Lee and
Mendelson 2008, Casadesus-Masanell and Llanes 2011, Cheng et al. 2011, Zhu and Zhou 2012, August
et al. 2014). The strategic choice between developing open-source and proprietary software has gathered
signiﬁcant attention in the literature as well (see, e.g., Lerner and Tirole 2005b, Lerner et al. 2006, Haruvy
et al. 2008, August et al. 2013, Wen et al. 2016). In particular, August et al. (2013) ﬁnd that if
an originator is suﬃciently eﬃcient in development, the licensing decision mainly depends on her ability
to harness the contributor’s development to improve quality: if the originator is adept at improving the
quality of her software/service package by utilizing the contributor’s development, then an OSS strategy
is optimal, otherwise the originator is better oﬀ keeping the software proprietary. They also show that
increased contributor eﬃciency can unexpectedly decrease welfare. This result can manifest when the
contributor is highly eﬃcient because if the originator opens up the source code, the originator can be
squeezed out of the services market as the contributor uses his development eﬃciency and strategic pricing
to open up a large gap between the overall attractiveness of his oﬀering and that of the originator. In such
circumstances, the originator may instead choose a proprietary strategy, which results in lower software
and service quality and decreased welfare.
Turning attention to the integration of facet [i], when an open-source approach is preferred to a propri-
etary one, an important question is how restrictive should the open-source license be. West (2003) argues
that competing forces of adoption and appropriability make ﬁrms choose among proprietary, open source,
and hybrid licensing strategies. Hawkins (2004) identiﬁes the primary costs associated with proprietary
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and open-source development and, through a series of examples, demonstrates when it is optimal to open
the code and the conditions under which viral licensing is preferred to public-style licensing. Gaudeul
(2004b) concludes that when developer wages are high and costs are low, GPL is preferred although the
existence of GPL can hurt social welfare. Asundi et al. (2012) show that ﬁrms may choose to release
open-source versions of their software products under competition because by doing so they can increase
the value of their closed-source product due to enhancements. Sen et al. (2011) model open-source license
choice for a project leader when the license aﬀects the incentives of subsequent developers. They ﬁnd that
leaders should adopt less restrictive licenses when signiﬁcant eﬀort of subsequent developers is required to
create derivative works. On the other hand, a more restrictive license is preferred when the eﬀort required
is smaller.
There is a rich stream of literature that empirically examines licensing of OSS. Lerner and Tirole (2005b)
build a simple model to examine the licensing decision, and empirically ﬁnd that restrictive licenses like
GPL would be unlikely candidates for OSS that runs in proprietary environments. Stewart et al. (2006)
study how both licensing and organizational sponsorship inﬂuence the success of open-source projects. They
ﬁnd that projects with a non-market sponsor and a nonrestrictive license tend to garner the most user
interest, which they demonstrate positively aﬀects development activity. More recent studies examine the
relationships between OSS licensing and developer motivations and attitudes (Sen et al. 2009), developer
membership and activity characterization (Colazo and Fang 2009), and social inﬂuence (Vir Singh and
Phelps 2013).
Our paper complements this literature on OSS licensing by theoretically exploring how diﬀerent licenses
aﬀect an originator ﬁrm’s decision on whether to choose an open-source strategy or proprietary strategy,
and how the social value associated with software can be increased by advocating particular licenses.
Selecting an open-source strategy has two eﬀects: a complementarity eﬀect and a strategic eﬀect. The
complementarity eﬀect stems from the beneﬁts associated with contributions from the community. These
beneﬁts can help increase the quality of both the base product as well as the services oﬀered in the market
by the originator. The strategic eﬀect stems from strategic contributors who invest eﬀort into the OSS
with the intention of competing against the originator for service contracts. The core contribution of our
paper is that we are able to characterize the inﬂuence of license restrictiveness on development incentives
and ultimately on the originator’s preferred source code strategy across diﬀerent economic regimes. In our
model, the answer to the licensing question ultimately relates to how licensing impacts the originator’s
ability to generate revenues in the services market. License restrictiveness sways the investment incentives
of contributors which, in turn, modiﬁes the pricing landscape for services. Since our model captures
sequential endogenous investment choices and Nash equilibrium pricing strategies for services, it enables
us to formally study the inﬂuence of cost structure, OSS licenses and preferences on source code strategy.
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3 Model
Our model builds on the one presented in August et al. (2013): A software originator (o) chooses a source
code strategy and price, and how much to invest in a software product she has created. Her ﬁrst decision in
the sequence, ρ, is to choose whether to license the product as a proprietary product (P ) or an open-source
one (O), i.e., ρ∈{P,O}. Once this decision has been made, her next decision is how much to invest in
eﬀort and development of the software, eo≥ 0, where these improvements to the software product and
services incur a convex cost of eﬀort Co(eo) βoe2o/2. After the initial investment and development by the
originator ﬁrm, a follower ﬁrm, the contributor (c), can also choose to invest ec≥ 0 in the software, with
the hope of proﬁting from providing services associated with the software product, incurring a cost of eﬀort
is Cc(ec)βce2c/2.4
After obtaining the software, in order to eﬀectively operate it and derive value, a customer needs
integration and support services. To the customer, the total quality of the software including services
depends on the eﬀort invested by the originator and contributor. There is a continuum of consumers
deﬁned by the consumer type parameter θ, which is uniformly distributed on Θ= [0, 1]. Consumer type θ
indicates the customer’s sensitivity to the quality of the software package, including services. A consumer
can choose either the originator or contributor to provide the necessary services. In addition, we extend
August et al. (2013) to give consumers the option to obtain a base level of service from either a competitive
services market or self service, which we denote by b. The base level of service is important to consider
because its presence not only captures a signiﬁcant way that many low-end users obtain open-source
integration services, but it also substantially shapes the strategic interaction between the originator and
the contributor. A type θ consumer derives value θQk if she chooses to obtain services from provider
k ∈ {o, c, b}, where Qk is the total quality of the software solution.
The development eﬀorts of the originator and the contributor have two eﬀects. First, they improve the
total base quality of the software solution itself, Qg. We model the eﬀect of the originator and contributor
investments on the base software quality as Qg  goeo + gcec where go, gc> 0 are multipliers capturing
the relative impact of each player’s eﬀort. The parameters go and gc in our model are associated with
the private provision of public good in that they reﬂect the extent to which private eﬀorts expended
build quality into the freely available base product.5 Public goods tend to be undersupplied by voluntary
contributions because of the free-rider problem (Groves and Ledyard 1977). Non-altruistic motivations are
4In some contexts, the contributor can be the individual developers who are not proﬁt seeking. We have also considered
this case in a later section and analytically shown that proﬁts, social welfare and consumer surplus increase as OSS licensing
becomes more restrictive, which is similar to the cases discussed in panels (c) and (d) of Figure 7. Please see the Online
Supplement for detailed analysis. We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
5Typically, the base OSS product is both non-rival and non-excludable, consistent with the nature of a public good
(Samuelson 1954).
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central to the discussion of the private provision of public goods (Andreoni 1988). In this vein, our work
captures how the base OSS product hinges on incentives of the contributing participants to distinguish
themselves as experts in the value-added software services market, which we next discuss.
The second eﬀect lies on the quality of ﬁrm-speciﬁc integration and support services, Qs. This eﬀect also
has two components: First, as a ﬁrm invests resources and eﬀort on a software product, it builds expertise
and competency in providing integration and services. This boosts the quality of the total software solution
the ﬁrm provides to customers. Second, a ﬁrm’s service quality can also be positively impacted by other
ﬁrms’ investments which yield publicly available OSS service support components, utility contributions, and
information. Therefore, in general, a ﬁrm that spends eﬀort in building expertise may beneﬁt from eﬀorts
and investments of all developers. Hence we model the eﬀect of originator and contributor’s investments
on their respective service qualities as Qso sooeo + socec and Qsc scoeo + sccec. We employ an additive
model. By doing so, we do not assume any complementary but will instead formally demonstrate that
originator and contributor eﬀorts can be strategic complements or strategic substitutes (Bulow et al. 1985)
in equilibrium. In the broader literature, quality is frequently modeled as a linear function of eﬀort or
investment of producers (see, e.g., Radner et al. 1986, Moldovanu and Sela 2001, Kuan 2001, Varian 2004).
In many cases, this is a simplifying assumption that is made for tractability and model transparency,
without sacriﬁcing the core variable relationships and insights from the model.
The parameters sOoo and s
O
cc represent the accumulation of knowledge, experience and expertise. Dut-
ton and Thomas (1984), building on Levy (1965), aptly categorize learning into two types: autonomous
and induced. Autonomous learning refers to the improvements that automatically result from sustained
production over a long period of time (Dutton and Thomas 1984. Induced learning refers to speciﬁc in-
vestments or eﬀorts made by the ﬁrm toward improvement. Models of autonomous learning often use
cumulative production as a proxy of experience or knowledge (see, e.g., Spence 1981, Fine 1986). Models
of induced learning use cumulative investments instead as a proxy (see, e.g., Arrow 1962, Dorroh et al.
1994). Li and Rajagopalan (1998) model both types of learning on productivity and quality in a produc-
tion environment. The OSS literature reﬂects the expertise of service providers gained by eﬀorts invested
into OSS (i.e., induced learning) in a similar manner. For example, Sen (2007) models the expertise of a
support services vendor as reducing the variable cost associated with usability, with quality levels being
held ﬁxed. August et al. (2013) model services expertise as an increase in quality for a ﬁxed variable cost,
further capturing the service provider’s incentives to invest eﬀorts. We similarly capture the impact of
induced learning on quality for the strategic players in our model with sOoo and s
O
cc.
The parameters sOco and s
O
oc capture the cross complementarities of strategic project participants as
determined by licensing and the governance structures of the OSS project. Such complementarities can
exist among ﬁrms contributing to OSS production. Speciﬁcally, OSS licensing can signiﬁcantly inﬂuence
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the extent to which an originator can leverage a contributor’s eﬀorts towards the originator’s total quality.
For example, restrictive licenses that require a contributor to fully document and contribute any new
functionality back to the OSS project and governance structures that require a contributor to provide
unit tests, use cases, and other information can altogether enhance the originator’s quality level in the
marketplace. This is particularly true for service-related utilities including system administration tools.
In a similar fashion, the contributor can also beneﬁt from the originator’s eﬀorts to the extent that the
governance structures are shaped to empower contributor’s in the services market. In Section 4.3, we
explore the impact of license restrictiveness on software outcomes.
The magnitudes of coeﬃcients sij and gk quantify the relative importance of common quality factors
versus ﬁrm-speciﬁc ones to consumers, which is largely determined by the particular software product mar-
ket and can change under proprietary and open-source regimes and critically depends on the restrictiveness
of the open-source license. When the software is proprietary, it is not open to outside contributions, hence
the contributor cannot add to the base software quality nor can the originator beneﬁt from the contrib-
utor’s eﬀorts and investment, i.e., gPc = 0 and s
P
oc = 0. Furthermore, since there is no major factor that
would necessarily change how the originator beneﬁts from its own eﬀort between proprietary and open-
source cases, we also assume sPoo = s
O
oo. Finally, when the consumer obtains a base level of service, i.e.,
when k= b, she does not receive the quality premium associated with obtaining service from an agent who
has committed signiﬁcant resources toward the development of the software and gained expertise. We
normalize this quality component to zero, i.e., Qsb = 0. The total quality of the software solution, when a
customer obtains service from provider k ∈ {o, c, b} is Qk = Qg +Qsk.
Consumers’ usage decisions are made in the last stage, at which point the policy, eﬀort levels, and prices
are ﬁxed. If the product is licensed as proprietary, the originator sets a price for the product pP and a price
for her services pPo , while a contributor only sets a price for his services oﬀering p
P
c . Under an open-source
strategy, the pricing of integration and services still occurs, with the originator and contributor setting
their service prices at pOo and p
O
c respectively, but the product price is zero (i.e., p
O =0). We denote the
marginal cost of providing services with c> 0. Under a software license strategy j ∈ {P,O} (Proprietary
or Open Source), denote the price charged by a competitive integrator as pjci. Then, the unit proﬁt for that
integrator is πjci = p
j
ci − c. That is, each competitive integrator makes a revenue of pjci at a cost of c for
an integration service. Under either licensing scenario, the competitive integrators are not diﬀerentiated
from each other in service quality.6 Since their services are undiﬀerentiated from one another and there are
6By “competitive integrator”, we mean any IT human resource who is able to provide basic services on the OSS product
but importantly is not involved in the development of the product and its direction (and therefore has not built the extensive
expertise that comes from OSS project involvement). A competitive integrator can include (i) small companies that oﬀer
basic IT services such as Open Source Architect, a small business in Nevada that provides JBoss consulting services and (ii)
individuals hired in house who have basic knowledge of an OSS product. It can even be the case that a large IT consulting
company sends out resources for paid help on technologies that they do not possess expert level knowledge of; this being an
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Figure 1: The model timeline in a tree format.
many of them, the competitive integrators engage in perfect price competition, and hence their services
are competitively priced at the marginal cost, i.e., pb = c.
In the proprietary case, a consumer with type θ can choose not to use the software product, purchase
the product and obtain competitive services, purchase both the product and services from the originator,
or purchase the product from the originator and contract with the contributor for services. Her net payoﬀ
from each action is given by
V P (θ)
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
QPo θ − pP − pPo if purchased the software, and contracted service with the originator ;
QPc θ − pP − pPc if purchased the software, and contracted service with the contributor ;
QPb θ − pP − c if purchased the software, and contracted service with a competitive integrator ;
0 if not purchased .
(1)
In the open-source case, the price of the software itself is zero, and the net payoﬀ for a consumer with type
θ is
V O(θ)
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
QOo θ − pOo if contracted service with the originator ;
QOc θ − pOc if contracted service with the contributor ;
QOb θ − c if contracted service with a competitive integrator ;
0 if not used .
(2)
In summary, the model timeline is as given in Figure 1.
Two industry structures commonly observed in practice can be characterized by speciﬁc relationships
between fundamental parameters of the model. A strong originator would be characterized by high βc and
sOoc (βoβc and sOco sOoc), i.e., the originator is relatively more cost eﬃcient and can strongly leverage
the eﬀort exerted by any subsequent contributor. These conditions reﬂect that the originator has better
resources for both developing the software at a lower cost and harnessing the contributions of others, in
unfortunately common occurrence in practice (Markon and Crites 2013).
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comparison to the outside contributor.7 On the other hand, a strong contributor would be characterized
by low βc and s
O
oc (βcβo and sOoc sOco), i.e., the contributor has the resources to be adept at developing
the software at a lower cost as well as leveraging the eﬀort invested in the project by others toward its own
beneﬁt. This often happens when the main outside contributor is a bigger and more powerful ﬁrm than
the originator.8 These labels will refer to these mathematical conditions and be used in Section 4.3.
4 Licensing Policy Analysis
In this section, we give an overview of the equilibrium derivation for the two licensing strategies, Proprietary
(Section 4.1) and Open-Source (Section 4.2). The technical derivations are given in full detail in the Online
Supplement.
4.1 Proprietary Licensing Equilibrium Characterization
The analysis of the equilibrium is by backward induction. Given the eﬀort levels, ePo and e
P
c , and prices,
pP , pPo and p
P
c , as ﬁxed, each consumer of type θ∈Θ chooses an action that maximizes her net payoﬀ given
in (1) which reﬂects the choices she has for obtaining services. Lemma EC.2 in the Online Supplement
presents the structure of the consumer market equilibrium in the ﬁnal stage.
After the eﬀort levels and hence the service quality levels are set, projecting the customers’ responses
to the prices as described above, the originator and the contributor set their prices. The originator sets
pP and pPo to maximize her ﬁnal stage proﬁt function. Her corresponding optimization problem can be
formulated as
max
pP , pPo
Π˘Po (p
P , pPo | pPc , ePo , ePc )  pP
∫
Θ 1u(θ)dθ +
(
pPo − c
) ∫
Θ 1o(θ)dθ . (3)
The contributor’s proﬁt maximization problem at this stage is
max
pPc
Π˘Pc (p
P
c | pP , pPo , ePo , ePc ) 
(
pPc − c
) ∫
Θ 1c(θ)dθ . (4)
7Such cases usually happen when the originator is a relatively big and established ﬁrm compared to the major outside
contributors. One open source project that ﬁts well with this characterization is JBoss application server. The JBoss project
was started in 1999 and quickly became a force in the middleware market with an entirely services-based business model
(Kerstetter 2004). JBoss Inc. harnessed the open source developer community well, becoming the leading services provider of
the open source product and maintaining tight control over the project’s evolution.
8An example for this case is the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) project, Geronimo. Geronimo is an open source
application server that was founded by members of the ASF. One company that oﬀers services related to many ASF open
source projects including Geronimo is Covalent Technologies, which employs some of the founders of Geronimo. However,
IBM dedicates a signiﬁcant amount of resources to the Geronimo project due to its own acquisition of Gluecode and interest
in providing services to the lower tier of the application server market, and IBM is the most prominent development leader
for the project. In this case, the contributor (IBM) is the more cost-eﬃcient entity who can strongly leverage the originator’s
eﬀort, while the originator tends to provide services to a smaller market.
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Solving (3) and (4) simultaneously gives rise to Nash equilibrium product and service prices. The following
lemma summarizes the equilibrium outcome in the pricing stage.9
Lemma 1 Let ePo and e
P
c be ﬁxed, and max(Qo, Qc)≥ c. The equilibrium prices, pP , pPo and pPc , satisfy:
Region I: If Qc>Qo>Qb and Qo≤ 3c, then
pP =
Qc(Qc − c)
3Qc −Qo , p
P
o =
(Qo +Qc)c− (Qc −Qo)2
3Qc −Qo , p
P
c =
Qc(Qc −Qo + 2c)
3Qc −Qo , (5)
and only the originator and the contributor are active in the services market.
Region II: If Qc>Qo>Qb and Qo> 3c, then
pP =
2Qc +Qo − 3c
6
, pPo = c−
Qc −Qo
3
, pPc = c+
Qc −Qo
3
, (6)
and only the originator and the contributor are active in the services market.
Region III: If Qo≥Qc≥Qb, then
pP =
Qo − c
2
, pPo = c , p
P
c = c , (7)
and only the originator is active in the services market.
Lemma 1 states that for any given eﬀort levels, under a proprietary license, in equilibrium, competitive
integrators are pushed out of the services market, and only the ﬁrms who invest in building expertise in the
software are active in selling services. The competitive integrators, who have not invested and hence are
not diﬀerentiated in quality, provide service at the base quality level at the unit price equaling to marginal
cost c. In comparison, larger ﬁrms who invested and improved their service quality can charge prices higher
than the marginal service cost since their quality levels generate additional value for the customers. If the
high quality options are priced suﬃciently low, it can be the case that no customer ﬁnds it preferable
to procure service from the competitive integrators, as better quality service at a good price is available.
Given this, in certain cases, the originator and the contributor ﬁrms may choose in equilibrium to lower
their prices so much that there is zero demand for purchasing services from the competitive integrators.
Such equilibrium outcomes, called limit pricing, are common in models of price competition (please see,
e.g., Bain 1949, Modigliani 1958, Gabszewicz and Thisse 1979, Tunca and Wu 2013). In particular, and
diﬀerent from prior studies on software competition, Lemma 1 demonstrates that for the proprietary license
case, limit pricing is likely to occur because the originator has additional pricing power when base software
and value-added services are priced separately. The originator charges both a price pP for the product
9For simplicity in exposition and to avoid trivialities, in Lemmas 1 and 2 we focus only on the parameter regions that are
relevant to the full game equilibrium.
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and a price for her services pPo , while a contributor only sets a price for his services oﬀering p
P
c . Because
the contributor is a strategic player, he can invest eﬀort to diﬀerentiate the quality of his oﬀering and
be active in the market. However, the competitive integrators do not invest eﬀort toward diﬀerentiation.
Therefore, an originator can utilize the additional price lever, pP , eﬀectively as a limit price to push them
out of the market while still using its service price, pPo , to extract surplus. As stated in Regions I and II,
if the contributor has a higher service quality, then the originator and the contributor share the services
market. However, if the originator has a higher quality (Region III), she can use her ﬂexibility to price the
product itself as well as the software services she provides to push the contributor out of the market and
become a monopolist.
At the investment stage, taking the equilibrium price formation given in Lemma 1 into account,
the contributor chooses an eﬀort level, ePc (e
P
o ), that maximizes his total proﬁt function, Π
P
c (e
P
c |ePo ) =
Π˘Pc (e
P
c |ePo ) − Cc(ePc ), where Π˘Pc is as given in (4) after observing the originator’s eﬀort investment level.
Considering this optimal contributor eﬀort characterization, ePc (e
P
o ), the originator sets an eﬀort level to
maximize her own total proﬁts, ΠPo (e
P
o ) = Π˘
P
o (e
P
o ) − Co(ePo ), where Π˘Po is as given in (3). Formally, let
p = (pP , pPo , p
P
c ), which reﬂects the equilibrium prices as functions of eﬀort levels. The originator solves
max
eP0 ≥0
ΠPo (e
P
o ) = p
P
∫
Θ 1u(θ, p, e
P
o , e
P
c (e
P
o ))dθ +
(
pPo − c
) ∫
Θ 1o(θ, p, e
P
o , e
P
c (e
P
o ))dθ − βo(ePo )2/2
s.t. p solves (3) and (4) given ePo , e
P
c (e
P
o ) as characterized in Lemma 1;
and ePc (e
P
o ) = argmax
ePc ≥0
ΠPc (e
P
c |ePo ) = argmax
ePc ≥0
{(
pPc − c
) ∫
Θ 1c(θ, p, e
P
o , e
P
c )dθ − βc(ePc )2/2
}
s.t. p solves (3) and (4) given ePo , e
P
c as characterized in Lemma 1.
(8)
For convenience in notation, we use ΠPo and Π
P
c to refer to the equilibrium payoﬀs of the originator and
the contributor under the proprietary strategy. The related equilibrium derivations are given in the Online
Supplement.10 In the resulting equilibrium, the originator and the contributor may form a duopoly in the
services market, or the originator may emerge as the exclusive service provider.
4.2 Open Source Licensing Equilibrium Characterization
The analysis of the equilibrium is similar to the proprietary case and again proceeds by backward induction.
The main diﬀerence is that when the software is licensed as open source, the originator cannot charge a
price for the software itself and both ﬁrms aim to make proﬁts purely from service provision. Given eﬀort
levels, eOo and e
O
c , and service prices, p
O
o and p
O
c , each consumer of type θ∈Θ chooses an action that
maximizes her net payoﬀ given in (2) which reﬂects the choices she has for obtaining services. Lemma
EC.3 in the Online Supplement presents the structure of the consumer market equilibrium in the ﬁnal
10See Lemmas 1 and EC.2 in the Online Supplement.
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stage.
At the pricing stage, again projecting the consumer market equilibrium as described above and given the
development eﬀort levels eOo and e
O
c , the originator and the contributor’s respective optimization problems
are
max
pOo
Π˘Oo (p
O
o | pOc , eOo , eOc ) 
(
pOo − c
) ∫
Θ 1o(θ)dθ , (9)
and
max
pOc
Π˘Oc (p
O
c | pOo , eOo , eOc ) 
(
pOc − c
) ∫
Θ 1c(θ)dθ . (10)
The ﬁrms compete in the services market by solving (9) and (10), which gives rise to Nash equilibrium
prices. The pricing equilibrium outcome is summarized in the next lemma.
Lemma 2 Given Qi>Qj >Qb and Qi>c where i denotes the higher quality provider between the Origi-
nator (o) and Contributor (c) and j denotes the remaining one, let Q = (Qi, Qj , Qb). There exist threshold
values 0≤ τA( Q)≤ τB( Q)≤Qj/2≤ τC( Q)11 such that
Region I: If c≤ τA( Q), then
pOi = c+
2(Qi −Qb)(Qi −Qj)
4(Qi −Qb)− (Qj −Qb) , p
O
j = c+
(Qj −Qb)(Qi −Qj)
4(Qi −Qb)− (Qj −Qb) , (11)
and the originator, contributor and competitive integrators are active in the services market.
Region II: If τA( Q)<c≤ τB( Q), then
pOi =
Qi −Qj
2
+
c(Qj +Qb)
2Qb
, pOj =
cQj
Qb
, (12)
and only the originator and contributor are active in the services market.
Region III: If τB( Q)<c≤Qj/2, then
pOi =
Qi(2(Qi −Qj) + 3c)
4Qi −Qj , p
O
j =
Qj(Qi −Qj) + c(2Qi +Qj)
4Qi −Qj , (13)
and only the originator and contributor are active in the services market.
Region IV: If Qj/2<c≤ τC( Q), then pOi = cQiQj , pOj = c, and only the higher quality of the originator and
contributor is active in the services market.
Region V: If c> τC( Q), then p
O
i =
Qi+c
2 , p
O
j = c, and only the higher quality of the originator and con-
tributor is active in the services market.
11Full characterizations of τA( Q), τB( Q), τC( Q) are given in the proof of Lemma 2 in the Online Supplement.
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Figure 2: The nature of the contributor’s proﬁt curve. Region labels match the distinct consumer market
structures identiﬁed in Lemma 2. The parameter values are eOo =2.5, go=3, gc=3, s
O
oo=4, s
O
oc=1, s
O
cc=3,
sOco=0.1, c=2, βo=0.3, and βc=0.065.
As can be seen in Lemma 2, under an open-source license, depending on the level of service costs, c, there
can be ﬁve diﬀerent market structures in the pricing equilibrium. First, if the service costs are low, i.e.,
in Region I, the potential net value from services in the market is high, and in equilibrium the providers
can proﬁtably target distinct consumer segments with their pricing. As a result, all three service providers
(the originator, contributor, and competitive integrators) will be actively present as a three-way oligopoly
in the market. In Regions II and III, as the service cost increases, the consumer population, for which the
value from services is higher than the service costs to have net positive value for using the software, shrinks.
Consequently, the originator and the contributor have to price their services closer to marginal cost c. This
tight pricing squeezes the competitive integrators who provide inferior quality service at marginal cost out
of the market. The market structure becomes a duopoly between the originator and contributor. Finally,
in Regions IV and V, the service costs are so high that the proﬁtable consumer segment becomes small.
Then, in equilibrium, there is room for only one ﬁrm to operate proﬁtably, and the higher quality one
between the originator and contributor prices out the other two options and becomes a monopoly in the
services market.
Using the equilibrium service price characterization given in Lemma 2, we can again analyze the sequen-
tial eﬀort investment problems for both the originator and contributor. Similar to the proprietary software
case, taking the eﬀort level of the originator eOo as ﬁxed, the contributor chooses e
O
c ≥ 0 to maximize
ΠOc (e
O
c |eOo ) = Π˘Oc (eOc |eOo ) − Cc(eOc ). Taking this contributor eﬀort best response, eOc (eOo ), the originator
chooses eOo ≥ 0 to maximize ΠOo (eOo ) = Π˘Oo (eOo )− Co(eOo ), where Π˘Oo and Π˘Oc are as given in (9) and (10),
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Figure 3: Market structure and ﬁrms’ eﬀort investments. Region labels indicate whether one, two, or three
ﬁrms have positive market shares in the services market. The parameter values are go=3, gc=3, s
O
oo=4,
sOoc=1, s
O
cc=3, s
O
co=0.1, c=2, βo=0.3, and βc=0.065.
respectively. Formally, let p = (pOo , p
O
c ). The originator solves
max
eOo ≥0
ΠOo (e
O
o ) =
(
pOo − c
) ∫
Θ 1o(θ, p, e
O
o , e
O
c (e
O
o ))dθ − βo(eOo )2/2
s.t. p solves (9) and (10) given eOo , e
O
c (e
O
o ) as characterized in Lemma 2;
and eOc (e
O
o ) = argmax
eOc ≥0
ΠOc (e
O
c |eOo ) = argmax
eOc ≥0
{(
pOc − c
) ∫
Θ 1c(θ, p, e
O
o , e
O
c )dθ − βc(eOc )2/2
}
s.t. p solves (9) and (10) given eOo , e
O
c as characterized in Lemma 2.
(14)
Again for convenience in notation, we use ΠOo and Π
O
c to refer to the equilibrium payoﬀs of the originator
and contributor under the opens-source strategy.
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the equilibrium investment decisions, eOo and e
O
c , for the originator and the
contributor and their eﬀects on the resolution of the rest of the game. In particular, Figure 2 depicts the
contributor’s decision problem by tracing how his proﬁt function changes as a function of his development
eﬀort level eOc given the originator’s investment level e
O
o . The market structure labels are as given in Lemma
2 for open-source licensing. Since in the ﬁgure the originator has suﬃcient committed investment in the
software, the overall starting software quality is high even with zero investment from the contributor.
Therefore, at small eOc , there is enough value for the consumers in the market that the originator and
contributor can coexist as a duopoly (Region II) with the originator having a higher service quality.
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As the contributor invests more in developing the software, after a certain point, the service qualities for
the originator and the contributor become closer and price competition between the two ﬁrms intensiﬁes,
resulting in lower proﬁts for both ﬁrms. Beyond a certain investment level eOc , the contributor becomes the
quality leader. However, as the contributor investment level increases, the overall software quality becomes
high enough that competitive integrators can have a segment of the service market; the market structure
becomes a three-way oligopoly as can be seen in the ﬁgure (Region I). In this region, the contributor is the
highest quality service provider and his overall proﬁts are maximized by choosing a high investment level
that induces a market structure where all three service options are actively present in equilibrium.
Figure 3 demonstrates the regions for the equilibrium service market structure. As can be seen in
the ﬁgure, when both the contributor’s and originator’s investment levels are very low (in the lower left
corner of the ﬁgure with white background), the software does not have suﬃcient quality to generate net
value from service so there are no users of the software – the product does not make it to the market. As
either the contributor’s or originator’s investment increases, the overall software solution starts to have net
positive value. However, for small investment levels, the quality of the total software solution is low and
the providers cannot charge a high price for their services. As a result, there is room for only one provider
in the market–the overall quality leader–and he or she prices both the lower quality developer and the
competitive integrators out of the market, becoming a monopolist for services (Regions IV and V).
On the other end of the spectrum, if one of the developer ﬁrms has signiﬁcantly higher quality than
the other two options (i.e., either the originator or the contributor invest heavily and one signiﬁcantly
more so than the other), then both providers will have suﬃcient value and the quality leader will achieve
suﬃcient separation from the other ﬁrm. In this case, all three service options o, c and b can have their own
distinct customer segments, actively contracting in equilibrium and the market structure will be a three-way
oligopoly (Region I). In the middle, however, when the originator’s and contributor’s investments are close
to one another, the service oﬀerings of the two ﬁrms are close substitutes and intense price competition
emerges. In that case, the equilibrium prices of the two higher quality service providers (o and c) drop low
enough that the competitive integrators are priced out of the market, resulting in a duopoly (Regions II
and III).
The general structure of the equilibrium regions in Figure 3 is robust. In fact, as the parameters
change, the layout of the regions stay the same but the picture can sway in two main ways, which are
displayed in Figure 4. First, if the originator becomes stronger by, for instance, having an improved ability
to beneﬁt from the contributor’s development eﬀorts (higher sOoc), then when the contributor invests in
development at a high level (i.e., for high eOc levels) the two ﬁrms can push the competitive integrators out
of the market more easily and achieve duopoly (Regions II and III) where the contributor is the product
quality leader. As a result, for the same investment levels, Region I in the upper quadrant, (i.e., where
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Figure 4: The parameter values are go=3, gc=3, s
O
oo=4, s
O
oc=2.5 for panel (a) and s
O
oc=1 for panel
(b), sOcc=3 for panel (a) and s
O
cc=50 for panel (b), s
O
co=0.1, c=2, βo=0.3, and βc=0.065. The market
structure labels, I, II, III, IV and V, are the same as those in Figure 3.
QOo < Q
O
c ) shrinks and is replaced mainly by Region III, as can be seen in panel (a) of the ﬁgure, i.e.,
the pattern sways counter-clockwise. On the ﬂip side, if the contributor becomes stronger by, for instance
by improved ability to beneﬁt from his own eﬀort (higher sOcc), then for the same investment levels the
contributor quality moves up, and the competitive integrators are more easily pushed out of the market for
the cases in which the originator is the quality leader. Therefore, the region where the market structure
is oligopoly (Region I) shrinks for QOo > Q
O
c . However, if the contributor is the quality leader, higher
sOcc results in an increased quality gap between the contributor and the originator, which allows the lower
quality competitor, namely the originator to increase his price. This increase relieves pressure on the low
cost competitive integrators and allows them to survive, resulting in a three-provider oligopoly (Region I)
replacing duopoly (Regions II and III) for QOo < Q
O
c . Consequently, in this case the pattern of the market
structures sways clockwise as can be seen in panel (b) of Figure 4.
4.3 Impact of Open-Source Licensing Policy
In this section, we explore the impact of license restrictiveness and project organization on proﬁtability
and social welfare and discuss under which conditions each style of license is better suited. Social welfare
is the sum of consumer surplus and the proﬁts of the ﬁrms in the market. Consumer surplus for a given
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licensing policy ρ ∈ {P,O}, CSρ, is
CSρ=
∫
Θ
1o(Qoθ − pρ − pρo)dθ +
∫
Θ
1c(Qcθ − pρ − pρc)dθ +
∫
Θ
1b(Qbθ − c)dθ . (15)
Substituting into the proﬁt expressions (3), (4), (9), and (10), social welfare then is given by
W ρ = CSρ +Πρo +Π
ρ
c
= CSρ + Π˘ρo − Co(eρo) + Π˘ρc − Cc(eρc)
=
∫
Θ
1o(Qoθ − c)dθ − Co(eρo) +
∫
Θ
1c(Qcθ − c)dθ − Cc(eρc) +
∫
Θ
1b(Qbθ − c)dθ . (16)
In our model, the parameter sOoc captures the contributor-to-originator cross complementarity of eﬀort
investment on the originator’s oﬀering and reﬂects the restrictiveness of the open-source license. Under
more restrictive licenses, the originator can reap the beneﬁts of the contributor’s eﬀort, and, hence, this type
of license is characterized by a high value of sOoc. Under more permissive licenses, since the contributor can
keep his software developments from the public, the originator beneﬁts less from the contributor’s eﬀort.
Hence, this style of license corresponds to a low value of sOoc. In practice, there are only a few categories
of licenses available which vary in their strength of restrictiveness. In many cases, a new OSS project may
rely on the components of existing OSS projects which signiﬁcantly constrains OSS license selection for
the new project. As an example, if an originator’s OSS project utilizes even one component governed by
the GPL, then her OSS project necessarily must also be GPL. For these reasons, we parameterize license
restrictiveness and the following table gives an overview of this perspective that we will be employing in
this section.
Table 1: The relative magnitude of sOoc across diﬀerent licensing scenarios
Low sOoc Medium s
O
oc High s
O
oc
Permissive licenses Partially Restrictive licenses Restrictive licenses
Non-copyleft Weak copyleft Copyleft / reciprocal
Minimal requirements Exceptions granted when only linking All derivative works inherit license
Ex. BSD, MIT, Apache Ex. LGPL, MPL Ex. GNU GPL, GNU AGPL
We begin by exploring the potential desirability of a less restrictive license for an originator and its
eﬀect on developer eﬀort levels, product quality, and welfare. From a software originator’s point of view,
a restrictive license is preferable to a permissive one in many respects. For example, a restrictive license
can maximize the returns an originator receives from the developments of subsequent contributors to the
project. An open question then is whether it is possible for a permissive license to actually be preferred
by a software originator. The following proposition explores this question.
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Proposition 1 When a strong contributor’s eﬀorts beneﬁt its own ﬁrm-speciﬁc quality component to a
greater extent than the originator’s, a less restrictive license can increase originator proﬁts and social
welfare. Technically, let 4/9< sOoc/s
O
cc< 1. Then there exists β¯ > 0 such that if βc < β¯, then the contributor
is the quality leader, i.e., Qc > Qo, and
(i) A less restrictive license increases the quality gap, the originator’s proﬁts and social welfare, i.e., if
sOoc decreases then Qc −Qo, ΠO, and WO increase;
(ii) Deﬁne r¯ = 40/(37 +
√
2169). If sOoc/s
O
cc< r¯, then there exists γ > 0 such that a less restrictive license
decreases consumer surplus if and only if gc<γ. If s
O
oc/s
O
cc> r¯, then a less restrictive license increases
consumer surplus.12
Proposition 1 makes an interesting observation: Despite the fact that a permissive license can limit
the beneﬁts that a software originator who chooses to go open source can reap from her product, it can
still be the case that the originator selects an open approach as her licensing style. This result emerges
from strategic considerations. Speciﬁcally, when the contributor is cost eﬃcient in development, he has
the potential to improve the overall quality of the product both for himself and the originator. However,
if the license is too restrictive and requires the contributor to make his developed code publicly available
(i.e., if sOoc is high), the originator beneﬁts in quality and then uses it to more eﬀectively compete against
the contributor in the services market. On the other hand, if the license is less restrictive, the total quality
of the contributor’s oﬀering may exceed that of the originator. Further, in such a case, as stated in part
(i) of Proposition 1, a less restrictive license increases the quality diﬀerence between the contributor’s and
the originator’s service quality levels, since it results in the originator beneﬁting less from the contributor’s
investments. Yet, even in such a case, the originator can increase her proﬁt by diﬀerentiating from the
contributor, serving a lower valuation consumer segment, and avoiding intense competition against the
contributor. In this case, under a restrictive license, the complementarity eﬀect is dominated by the
strategic eﬀect and the price competition in the services market becomes too intensive. However, under
a less restrictive license, the complementarity eﬀect dominates the strategic eﬀect because it enables the
contributor to become the quality leader which, in turn, enables the originator to beneﬁt from contributions
while providing services in a less competitive market. Hence, a less restrictive license, such as LGPL, can
indeed beneﬁt the originator’s proﬁts as stated in part (i) of Proposition 1, even though the originator
sacriﬁces being the quality leader in equilibrium. Moreover, provided that the eﬀects of the contributor’s
eﬀorts on improving common quality factors are appreciable, a permissive license is not only more proﬁtable
to the originator but can also improve welfare by boosting developer eﬀorts and improving overall software
quality oﬀered to consumers.
12The closed form expression of γ is given in the proof provided in the Online Supplement.
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Figure 5: Social Welfare and Consumer Surplus with respect to sOoc. The parameter values for panel (a)
are go=1, gc=0.1, s
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It is important to note that consumer surplus does not always go hand in hand with social welfare.
Part (ii) of Proposition 1 states that when the contributor’s impact on the base software quality is less
pronounced, choosing a less restrictive (i.e., low sOoc) license, can hurt consumer surplus despite increasing
social welfare. This is because when the license becomes less restrictive and the contributor is strong, as
explained above, the originator allows the contributor to become the quality leader in the services market,
and in order to diﬀerentiate her service quality from that of the contributor’s, she does not invest in quality
improvement much. As a consequence, the service quality increases but price competition between the two
ﬁrms in the services market is less intense and the consumers face higher prices. In addition, if the ﬁrm
that makes the main investment (i.e., the contributor) does not have a strong impact in improving the
base software quality (i.e., if gc is small), then the originator’s overall quality does not suﬃciently improve
to compensate for the higher prices the consumers face. Therefore, the net eﬀect is that consumer surplus
suﬀers. At the same time, the ﬁrm proﬁts increase as a result of increased prices; the ﬁrm reaps the beneﬁts
of improved service quality, which can result in increased total welfare. This can also be seen in panel (a)
of Figure 5. As the ﬁgure demonstrates, there is a wide range of sOoc values (marked as range A), for which
decreased open-source license restrictiveness (lower sOoc) can decrease consumer surplus while increasing
total welfare.
Under these conditions, when the contributor is stronger than the originator of the product, a so-
cial planner who weighs consumer surplus higher than ﬁrm proﬁts may choose to impose regulations to
strengthen open-source licensing restrictions, despite the fact that such action would reduce the overall
social value generated by the software. Consistent with the mission of the FTC, it is important to address
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market situations like this one where a ﬁrm becomes relatively too strong and leverages its market power
to leave consumers in a manner that is worse oﬀ (FTC 2017). Our work advises regulating bodies like
the FTC to determine promising ways forward that help protect consumer surplus under such circum-
stances. One way is to advocate that OSS originators structure project governance to ensure that project
contributors commit suﬃcient code to common code bases so that the impact of license restrictiveness
on consumer surplus and social welfare is well aligned. In particular, if the contributor’s impact on base
software quality is high enough, this pushes the overall product quality up and compensates for the higher
prices paid by the consumers, and both consumer surplus and social welfare can increase together with
decreased open-source license restrictiveness, as stated in the proposition and can be seen in panel (b) of
Figure 5.
Since permissive licenses increase the incentives for contributors to invest in software development and
thus help improve software quality, one may suggest that this type of licensing is better from a policy
perspective as it creates the right incentives for developers. In fact, one argument against GPL-style
licenses is that such licenses restrict the freedom of contributors by forcing them to release their software
developments to the public against their own interests, which can in turn hurt software development,
quality and ultimately welfare. However, the strategic involvement of ﬁrms in open-source licensing is
inherently complex, and, as demonstrated in the following proposition, the eﬀect of GPL-style licensing
can, in fact, be quite the opposite.
Proposition 2 If the contributor is eﬃcient in development, a more restrictive license can increase, the
originator and contributor development investments, total software quality, originator proﬁts, consumer
surplus and social welfare. Technically, there exist ν, ν¯ > 0, such that when sOoc>s
O
cc, ν < c< ν¯, gc(4s
O
oc −
7sOcc)<s
O
cc(4s
O
oc − sOcc), and βc is suﬃciently low, Qo > Qc, and a more restrictive license increases (i) eOo
and eOc , Qo and Qc, and the quality gap, Qo −Qc; (ii) Πo, Πc, CSO, and WO.
Proposition 2 demonstrates that, despite the arguments suggesting that GPL-style licenses conﬂict with
contributor incentives and, hence, may hurt the value generated by the open-source project as a whole,
GPL-style licensing may actually create the right incentives and improve not only originator proﬁts but
welfare as well. Further, although it forces a contributor to share the product of his eﬀorts with the public,
including the originator who is his main competitor, even the contributor can still be better oﬀ with such
a restrictive license. The key here is the strategic interaction between the originator and the contributor.
The intuition for this result is best illustrated in Figure 6, which contrasts the ﬁrms’ incentives under
a permissive license, characterized by low sOoc (panels (a) and (b)), and a restrictive license, characterized
by high sOoc (panels (c) and (d)). As demonstrated in panel (a), the originator loses money for low levels of
investment since the overall quality of her package is too low to charge high enough prices to recover the
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Figure 6: The impact of licensing choice on ﬁrm proﬁts. Panels (a) and (b) illustrate the originator and
contributor proﬁt curves, respectively, under a less restrictive license (sOoc=4), and panels (c) and (d) show
the impact of a more restrictive license (sOoc=7). The parameter values for all panels are go=3, gc=3,
sOoo=7, s
O
cc=3, s
O
co=0.10, s
P
co=0.05, s
P
cc=0, c=21, βo=0.30, and βc=0.04.
costs of providing service. As the originator’s investment increases, she begins to make positive proﬁts.
However, until the originator’s investment reaches a certain level, the contributor’s proﬁt curve is strictly
decreasing in eOc as depicted in panel (b) at the optimal originator investment level of e
O
o =7.72, for this
given level of sOoc. For higher levels of originator contribution, it becomes optimal for the contributor to
make positive investments as seen in panel (b) when the originator sets an investment level of eOo =12.75.
Examining the contributor’s proﬁt curves which are illustrated in panels (b) and (d), it is important to
note that his proﬁt as a function of his own eﬀort can be bimodal. As a result, the originator’s proﬁt
function can have a discontinuity which reﬂects the contributor’s jumping up of eﬀort when eOo increases
past a critical level.
However, since the originator does not beneﬁt much from the contributor’s eﬀorts in this case, she prefers
to restrict her own eﬀort level such that the contributor does not invest and stays out of the services market
(i.e., the strategic eﬀect outweighs the complementarity eﬀect). On the other hand, under a restrictive
license such as GPL, the originator can strongly beneﬁt from the contributor’s software developments (i.e.,
sOoc is high) while maintaining her position as the quality leader. In such a case, the originator can be better
oﬀ with a high level of investment, which also induces the contributor to invest in the project, as seen in
panels (c) and (d) of Figure 6. Therefore, both originator and contributor qualities increase with a more
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Figure 7: The impact of licensing choice on ﬁrm proﬁts and social welfare. Panels (a) and (c) illustrate the
originator’s proﬁt under open source and proprietary strategies, while panels (b) and (d) plot social welfare.
The parameter values for panels (a) and (b) are go=0.1, gc=1, s
O
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strategy is WP = 0.75 in panel (b). In panels (b) and (d), WSP denotes social welfare under the social
planner, WFM denotes social welfare under the free market outcome, and ΔW = WSP −WFM .
restrictive license compared to a permissive one, as stated in part (i) of Proposition 2. Further, the quality
diﬀerence is also ampliﬁed, which allows the contributor and the originator to better diﬀerentiate from each
other, which in turn increases both their proﬁts as stated in part (ii). Thus, the stronger complementarity
eﬀect helps to limit the impact of the strategic eﬀect. Finally, the across the board increase in quality with
the more restrictive license also increases consumer surplus and the overall welfare, again as stated in part
(ii) of the proposition.
Figure 7 illustrates the originator’s licensing choice and its impact on welfare. As can be seen in panel
(a), if the license is too permissive so that the originator cannot strongly beneﬁt from the contributor’s
eﬀorts (i.e., when sOoc is low), it does not pay oﬀ for the originator to pursue an open-source strategy under
this licensing, and the originator’s best option is to keep the software proprietary. As the originator’s returns
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from contributor eﬀorts increase, i.e., as sOoc increases, a more restrictive open-source license can become
the best option for her: by becoming the lower-quality service provider in the market, the originator can
induce increased investment by the contributor. However, structuring more restrictive licenses to extract
increased returns does not necessarily pay oﬀ. With further increases in sOoc, the quality gap between
the contributor and the originator decreases, which reduces the contributor’s incentives for development.
Hence, such an increase in license restrictiveness can reduce originator proﬁts as we discussed above in
Proposition 1.13 This decrease in originator proﬁts can be seen in panel (a) of Figure 7.
In panel (b), we plot the welfare associated with an open-source outcome. In this case, the discontinuity
observed stems from a signiﬁcant scaling back of contributor eﬀort due to increases in sOoc. In particular,
when the originator’s ability to beneﬁt from the contributor’s investment increases, beyond a certain point,
the contributor is better oﬀ limiting his investment; higher investment levels tend to strongly serve the
quality of the originator. Therefore, as it was similarly depicted in Figure 6, the contributor may lower
his investment, eOc by shifting to a distant local maximizer, which discontinuously reduces the overall
software and service quality, and hence results in a discontinuity on the welfare curve. At a certain point,
a proprietary strategy may once again become the best strategy for a software originator. However, higher
sOoc values can create incentives for the originator to invest at high levels, engendering more separation
and inducing further investments by the contributor. Consequently, an open-source strategy can again
obtain, and these increased license requirements that enable the originator to extract larger beneﬁts from
contributor eﬀorts can be preferred as Proposition 2 indicates.
Moreover, as is illustrated in panel (b) of Figure 7, in the lower end of the sOoc spectrum, increasing
the openness requirements of the software license may reduce welfare by inducing decreased investments
by the contributor. On the other hand, in the higher end of the spectrum, imposing stricter openness
requirements, as in GPL-style licenses, can beneﬁt welfare by improving quality for all participants. To
gain intuition through a simple example, note that the originator often will have a discrete set of licensing
options. Suppose that the originator has two licensing options with sOoc corresponding to the two levels
marked in the ﬁgure: sLoc and s
H
oc (low and high license restrictiveness, respectively). In the free market
outcome, as can be seen in panel (a), the originator’s proﬁt is higher under the more restrictive option,
sHoc, so she chooses this restrictive license option. However, as is shown in panel (b), social welfare is
signiﬁcantly higher under the less restrictive license option sLoc; a welfare maximizing social planner would
want to enforce limitations on license restrictiveness, eliminating the restrictive option sHoc. In this case,
there would be a signiﬁcant welfare diﬀerence between the free-market licensing outcome and the social
13Also, by taking a point in this region (e.g., sOoc=0.60), we can demonstrate the wide parameter range for which Proposition
1 is satisﬁed. Consistent with the results from Proposition 1, by slightly decreasing sOoc from 0.60, proﬁts increase, and, as
can be seen in panel (b), social welfare increases. Further, we ﬁnd that these results continue to hold for any gc satisfying
0≤ gc<∞, and βc can be increased up to ﬁvefold.
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planner enforced outcome which is depicted in panel (b).
In contrast, when the originator is strong, the diﬀerence between the free-market outcome and the
social planner’s choice for licensing tends to decrease. As the originator becomes stronger compared to the
contributor, her trade-oﬀ between harvesting the beneﬁts of the contributors’ investment (complementarity
eﬀect) and keeping him in check in the services market (strategic eﬀect) weakens (i.e., the complementarity
eﬀect starts to dominate). This is because when the originator is strong relative to the contributor, she no
longer needs nor relies on a large investment by the contributor. Hence, she no longer needs to incentivize
the contributor to invest a signiﬁcant amount to develop the software. Therefore, a restrictive license
(high sOoc) maximizes her proﬁt as can be seen from panel (c) of Figure 7, since beneﬁtting from the
contributor’s investment helps prevent the contributor from gaining a quality advantage in the services
market. Continuing with the simple example discussed above, given an option between the same two sOoc
levels, sLoc and s
H
oc, in the free-market outcome, the originator would choose s
H
oc, the restrictive license.
Unlike the strong contributor case however, in a setting with a strong originator, this restrictive license
also maximizes welfare since it maximizes the originator’s investment and the overall software and service
quality, as is displayed in panel (d). Consequently, both the free market and social welfare maximizing
outcomes have the same licensing choice, sHoc, and the diﬀerence in welfare between the two outcomes is
zero.
5 Discussion of the Model, Analysis, and Limitations
5.1 Profit-Seeking Contributors
Our model is one of the ﬁrst to capture the simultaneously collaborative and competitive relationship
between the proﬁt-seeking ﬁrms that invest in open-source software development, intending to proﬁt from
provision of software integration services. The proﬁt-seeking behavior of the contributor ﬁrm and the
ensuing strategic interaction plays a critical role in licensing decisions. To see this, we have analyzed a
version of our model with contributors who are not proﬁt seeking and participate in software development
for other reasons such as altruism or as hobbyism. We show that with such contributors, the originator’s
critical strategic considerations of pricing, investment, and licensing decisions we discussed in the paper
disappear. In particular, in such a case, the eﬀect of license restrictiveness on the originator’s proﬁts would
simply be monotonically increasing, and she would set the open-source license as restrictive as possible to
maximize the beneﬁts she derives from their eﬀorts.14 Therefore, we can conclude that the proﬁt-seeking
behavior of open-source contributors plays a critical role in open-source development investments and
licensing choice.
14We provide this model and its analysis in Section B of the Online Supplement.
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5.2 The Role of Competitive Integrators
Competitive integrators are pervasive and serve an important role in IT services markets. We include them
in the model because their role in these markets signiﬁcantly shapes the strategic decisions being made by
the originator and contributor, particularly when contemplating diﬀerent OSS licensing arrangements. In
particular, their existence becomes quite impactful as the implementation cost of these services becomes
higher. In such cases, it becomes more diﬃcult to retain adequate margins in the services market because
higher quality levels are necessary and investments to achieve them are quite costly. Higher licensing
restrictiveness can help boost quality by leveraging the contributor’s eﬀort but ultimately it will be in
the best interest of the strategic players to set prices in a manner that strategically push the competitive
integrators out of the market. We demonstrate that the existence of competitive integrators pricing at cost
can lead to more competitive outcomes where strategic players utilize limit pricing and GPL licenses can
have a positive impact on qualities, proﬁts and welfare. Competitive integrators are fundamental to this
result.
5.3 Service Provision Costs
In our model, we assumed that service provision costs are independent of service quality. This is a reason-
able assumption from the perspectives of practice and modeling. In general, when ﬁrms invest to develop
software, the service quality improves from built-in expertise and better developed utilities and tools. That
is, a service provider ﬁrm can charge more for the higher quality service, but it does not mean that the
marginal cost of providing the service has gone up. In other words, the built-in expertise and the developed
support software in this case can be considered as ﬁxed costs, as once those are attained there is no real
increase in economic costs of providing services. Further, even if there were an increase in the marginal
costs of providing services, from a modeling perspective as long as there were some gains in quality through
investment, the model outcome would be similar or equivalent in substance to a constant service cost model
in that an increase in costs can be mathematically transformed and absorbed in the value generated by
the quality increase.
5.4 Robustness and the Regions of Applicability
Our propositions and proofs use asymptotic analysis, which is standard and often used in microeconomic
analysis when the analysis is complex (see, e.g., Li et al. 1987, Laﬀont and Tirole 1988, Pesendorfer and
Swinkels 2000, and Vereshchagina and Hopenhayn 2009 among many others). Given the complexity of
the setting (e.g., involvement of multiple layers of nested optimizations), it is not possible to obtain a full
analytical identiﬁcation of the regions under all parameter sets. However, our results are not restricted
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to limits, and instead are robust and satisﬁed for wide parameter regions. One can perform a sensitivity
analysis and numerically identify the parameter regions where the results are valid. Panels (a) and (b)
of Figure 8 demonstrates sample applicability regions for Propositions 1 and 2, respectively. As can be
seen from panel (a), Proposition 1 is valid on a broad region. Fixing other parameters, under the strong
contributor regime (i.e., when βc  βo), with any combination of βc/βo and sOoc/sOcc ratios in the region
labeled with A, the statement of the proposition would hold. Similarly, panel (b) demonstrates an example
for the upper and lower bounds of the service cost parameter c, ν and ν¯ as a function of βc/βo as is
characterized in Proposition 2. One can again observe that there is a broad parameter region (labeled B),
on which the proposition statement is valid.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this note, we presented a model of OSS development that captures the incentives for ﬁrms to pursue and
contribute to an open-source project, driven by a market for software services. We studied the trade-oﬀs
faced by an originating ﬁrm deciding between open and proprietary approaches for her software products.
If she pursues a proprietary strategy, the ﬁrm does not beneﬁt from the contributions of other developers
dedicating resources toward creating higher quality software that carries a higher value in the consumer
market. However, the ﬁrm retains the ability to generate revenues from selling copies of her product
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regardless of whether she provides the associated services aspect. Should a ﬁrm choose an open-source
strategy, she can beneﬁt from the positive quality eﬀects. However, she can no longer charge purely for
her software product. Her primary source for revenues, under an open-source path, lies with oﬀering
integration and support services, which is of signiﬁcant value to consumers in most cases. This competitive
aspect is characterized by quality competition between originating and contributing ﬁrms as they invest
eﬀort into open-source development, followed by price competition in the services market.
Given the wide range of licenses employed in the open-source domain, we studied whether restrictive
or permissive licenses are better for proﬁtability and welfare. We ﬁnd that in cases where an open-source
contributor is adept in reaping the beneﬁts of his own eﬀorts to a greater extent than the originator,
requiring or favoring less restrictive licenses (e.g., BSD style) can increase both the originator’s proﬁts and
welfare. However, if the originator can harness contributor eﬀorts well and the service costs are high, a
more restrictive (e.g., GPL style) license can increase developers’ contributions and overall software quality.
It is worth noting that with a permissive license, the contributor could, in certain cases, have the option
of opening up his contributions and beneﬁting the originator in the services market, eﬀectively replicating
the outcome of the restrictive license. In other words, under open-source licensing, in some cases, he can
eﬀectively increase sOoc if his proﬁt increases. However, there are a couple of concerns about including this
option in the current paper. First, modeling it would add yet another layer of optimization on top of the
two ﬁrms’ pricing and eﬀort levels, and would make the problem much more complex, the exposition less
transparent, and the solution less tractable. Second, it is likely that in many cases, facing an option of
opening up his software when he is not required to do so, the contributor would likely not choose such an
option that would beneﬁt his competitor and reduce his own proﬁt in the services marketplace. Hence,
given that including this option is unlikely to change the outcome while making the analysis and the
exposition signiﬁcantly more complex and less transparent, and aiming to keep the paper’s focus sharp, we
chose not to include this option in the current paper. However, this is an interesting potential extension to
the model that could be explored in a future study to deepen the understanding of license restrictiveness
on the contributor ﬁrms’ strategic decisions to voluntarily open their contributed code when they are not
required to do so by the license set by the software originator.
With signiﬁcantly increased usage and attention in the past decade, OSS is an increasingly prominent
tool in today’s business economic environment and promises to generate tremendous value for its users.
What is even more encouraging is the evolution in recent years of service-based revenue models that provide
steady revenue streams for companies that invest, develop, maintain and support this important software
solution approach. Regulating bodies and policy makers, as well as companies that develop, support or
use OSS, whether they are government agencies or software and trade associations should be aware of the
economic dynamics of OSS and how to harness its potential value.
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A. Mathematical Preliminaries and Proofs of Propositions
Lemma EC.1 Let pP , pPo , p
P
c , e
P
o and e
P
c be ﬁxed, and let i denote the higher quality provider between
the Originator (o) and Contributor (c) and j be the remaining one. That is, if Qo ≥ Qc then i = o and
j = c and vice-versa. Then, the equilibrium consumer strategy proﬁle is characterized by three threshold
values 0≤ θb≤ θj ≤ θi≤ 1 such that for customer θ,
(1) if θi≤ θ≤ 1, then she will purchase the product and contract service with i, i.e., 1i(θ) = 1;
(2) if θj ≤ θ < θi, then she will purchase the product and contract service with j, i.e., 1j(θ) = 1;
(3) if θb≤ θ < θj, then she will purchase the product and contract service with a competitive integrator, i.e.,
1b(θ) = 1;
(4) if 0≤ θ < θb, then she will not purchase the product, i.e., 1u(θ) = 0 ,
where 1u(θ) is an indicator that the type θ consumer uses/purchases the product and 1k(θ) is an indicator
that type θ consumer chooses to obtain the service from provider k ∈ {o, c, b} as a response to eﬀort and
pricing decisions.
Proof of Lemma EC.1: Note that 1k(θ) = 0 for all k if and only if 1u(θ) = 0. From (1), for the
customer of type θ to contract service with provider i, type θ customer must satisfy
Qiθ − p− pi≥ max (Qjθ − p− pj, Qbθ − p− c, 0) . (EC.1)
Suppose that for some θˆ1< 1, a customer with type θˆ1 contracts with provider i. Then, from (EC.1), it
follows that Qiθˆ1 − p− pi≥ max(Qj θˆ1 − p− pj , Qbθˆ1 − p− c, 0). Because, by deﬁnition, Qi≥Qj ≥Qb, we
obtain 1i(θ) = 1 for all θˆ1≤ θ≤ 1. Therefore, there exists θi ∈Θ such that for all θ∈Θ, 1i(θ)= 1 if and
only if θ≥ θi. Similarly, by (1), for 1j(θ)= 1, we need to have
Qjθ − p− pj ≥ max (Qiθ − p− pi, Qbθ − p− c, 0) . (EC.2)
EC.1
Suppose that for some θˆ2<θi, we have 1j(θˆ2)= 1. Then, by (EC.2), it follows thatQj θˆ2−p−pj ≥ max(Qiθˆ2−
p− pi, Qbθˆ2− p− c, 0). Because Qj ≥Qb, by (EC.2), and by the characterization of θi, we obtain 1j(θ)= 1
for all θˆ2≤ θ < θi. Therefore, there exists θj ∈Θ such that for all θ∈Θ, 1j(θ)= 1 if and only if θj ≤ θ < θi.
If there does not exist θˆ2<θi such that 1j(θˆ2)= 1, then, without loss of generality, we can set θj = θi. Next,
by (1), θ must satisfy
Qbθ − p− c≥ max (Qiθ − p− pi, Qjθ − p− pj, 0) (EC.3)
as a necessary condition for 1b(θ)=1, i.e., the customer with type θ purchased and contracted service
with a competitive integrator. Suppose that for some θˆ3<θj, we have 1b(θˆ3)= 1. By (EC.3), we obtain
Qbθˆ3 − p − c≥ max(Qiθˆ3 − p − pi, Qj θˆ3 − p − pj, 0). Using this fact, (EC.3), and the characterizations
of θi and θj, it follows that 1b(θ)= 1 for all θˆ3≤ θ <θj . Therefore, there exists θb ∈Θ such that for all
θ∈Θ, 1b(θ)= 1 if and only if θb≤ θ < θj. Similarly, if there does not exist θˆ3<θj such that 1b(θˆ3)= 1,
then, without loss of generality, we can set θb= θj. Finally, suppose θ < θb. By the characterization of θi,
θj, and θb, it follows that 1u(θ) = 0. 
We next provide the consumer market characterization for the proprietary strategy. The following
technical lemma (Lemma EC.2) presents this characterization and is used in the proof of Lemma 1. Proofs
of Lemmas EC.2 and 1 are similar to the proofs of their Open Source counterparts, Lemmas EC.3 and 2,
which are more comprehensive and presented in detail in this supplement. We hence omit the proofs of
the former two here for conciseness.
Lemma EC.2 Let p, po, pc, eo and ec be ﬁxed. Suppose Qc>Qo>Qb. The consumer market structure
has the following characterization.
(1) If Qb≥ c, 0≤ p≤Qb − c and either p(Qo−Qb)+cQoQb ≤ po≤
pc(Qo−Qb)+c(Qc−Qo)
Qc−Qb and
p(Qc−Qb)+cQc
Qb
≤ pc≤ p(Qo−Qb)+cQoQb +Qc−Qo, or pc−(Qc−Qo)≤ po≤
pc(Qo−Qb)+c(Qc−Qo)
Qc−Qb and
p(Qo−Qb)+cQo
Qb
+
Qc −Qo≤ pc≤ c+Qc −Qb, then
0≤ θb= p+ c
Qb
≤ θo= po − c
Qo −Qb ≤ θc=
pc − po
Qc −Qo ≤ 1 ; (EC.4)
(2) If one of the following holds:
(a) Qb≥ c, 0≤ p≤Qb − c, pc − (Qc −Qo)≤ po≤ pcQo−p(Qc−Qo)Qc , and
c≤ pc≤ p(Qc−Qb)+cQcQb ;
(b) Qc≥ c, Qb − c≤ p≤Qc − c, pc − (Qc −Qo)≤ po≤ pcQo−p(Qc−Qo)Qc , and
c≤ pc≤Qc − p;
(c) Qb≥ c, 0≤ p≤Qb − c, pc − (Qc −Qo)≤ po≤ p(Qo−Qb)+cQoQb , and
p(Qc−Qb)+cQc
Qb
≤ pc≤ p(Qo−Qb)+cQoQb +Qc −Qo,
then
0≤ θb= θo= p+ po
Qo
≤ θc= pc − po
Qc −Qo ≤ 1 ; (EC.5)
EC.2
(3) If either Qb≥ c, 0≤ p≤Qb − c, po≥ pcQo−p(Qc−Qo)Qc , and c≤ pc≤
p(Qc−Qb)+cQc
Qb
,
or Qc≥ c, Qb − c≤ p≤Qc − c, po≥ pcQo−p(Qc−Qo)Qc , and c≤ pc≤Qc − p, then
0≤ θb= θo= θc= p+ pc
Qc
≤ 1 ; (EC.6)
(4) If Qb≥ c, 0≤ p≤Qb − c, and either p(Qo−Qb)+cQoQb ≤ po≤ c+Qo −Qb and pc≥ c+Qc −Qb,
or p(Qo−Qb)+cQoQb ≤ po≤ pc − (Qc −Qo) and
p(Qo−Qb)+cQo
Qb
+Qc −Qo≤ pc≤ c+Qc −Qb, then
0≤ θb= p+ c
Qb
≤ θo= po − c
Qo −Qb ≤ θc=1 ; (EC.7)
(5) If one of the following holds:
(a) Qb≥ c, 0≤ p≤Qb − c, po≤ pc − (Qc −Qo), and c≤ pc≤ p(Qo−Qb)+cQoQb +Qc −Qo;
(b) Qc≥ c, Qb − c≤ p≤Qc − c, po≤ pc − (Qc −Qo), and c≤ pc≤Qc − p;
(c) Qb≥ c, 0≤ p≤Qb − c, po≤ p(Qo−Qb)+cQoQb , and pc≥
p(Qo−Qb)+cQo
Qb
+Qc −Qo;
(d) p≥Qc − c, po≤Qo − p, and pc≥ c,
(e) Qc≥ c, Qb − c≤ p≤Qc − c, po≤Qo − p, and pc≥Qc − p,
then
0≤ θb= θo= p+ po
Qo
≤ θc=1 ; (EC.8)
(6) If Qb≥ c, 0≤ p≤Qb − c, po≥ c+Qo −Qb, and pc≥ c+Qc −Qb, then
0≤ θb= p+ c
Qb
≤ θo= θc=1 ; (EC.9)
(7) If Qb≥ c, 0≤ p≤Qb − c, and po≥ pc(Qo−Qb)+c(Qc−Qo)Qc−Qb , and
p(Qc−Qb)+cQc
Qb
≤ pc≤ c+Qc −Qb, then
0≤ θb= p+ c
Qb
≤ θo= θc= pc − c
Qc −Qb ≤ 1 ; (EC.10)
(8) If p≥Qb − c, po≥Qo − p, and pc≥Qc − p, then
0≤ θb= θo= θc=1 ; (EC.11)
Lemma EC.3 Let pOo , p
O
c , e
O
o and e
O
c be ﬁxed and let i denote the higher quality provider among the
Originator (o) and the Contributor (c) and j be the remaining one. That is, if Qo > Qc then i = o and
j = c and vice-versa.
EC.3
(i) The equilibrium consumer strategy proﬁle is characterized by three threshold values 0≤ θb≤ θj ≤ θi≤ 1
such that for customer θ,
(1) if θi≤ θ≤ 1, then she will use the product and contract service with i, i.e., 1i(θ) = 1;
(2) if θj ≤ θ < θi, then she will use the product and contract service with j, i.e., 1j(θ) = 1;
(3) if θb≤ θ < θj, then she will use the product and contract service with a competitive integrator, i.e.,
1b(θ) = 1;
(4) if 0≤ θ < θb, then she will not use the product, i.e., 1u(θ) = 0.
(ii) The consumer market structure has the following characterization of regions:15
(1) If Qb≥ c, cQj/Qb≤ pj ≤ c+Qj −Qb, and pj(Qi−Qb)−c(Qi−Qj)(Qi−Qb)−(Qi−Qj) ≤ pi≤ pj +Qi −Qj, then
0≤ θb= c
Qb
≤ θj = pj − c
Qj −Qb ≤ θi=
pi − pj
Qi −Qj ≤ 1 ; (EC.12)
(2) If pjQi/Qj ≤ pi≤ pj + Qi − Qj and either Qb≥ c and pj ≤ cQj/Qb, or Qb≤ c and pj ≤Qj are
satisﬁed, then
0≤ θb= θj = pj
Qj
≤ θi= pi − pj
Qi −Qj ≤ 1 ; (EC.13)
(3) If one of the following holds: Qb≥ c, pj ≤ cQj/Qb, and pi≤ pjQi/Qj ; Qb≤ c, pj ≤Qj, and
pi≤ pjQi/Qj ; Qb≥ c, pj ≥ cQj/Qb, and pi≤ cQi/Qb; or Qb≤ c, pj ≥Qj, and pi≤Qi, then
0≤ θb= θj = θi= pi
Qi
≤ 1 ; (EC.14)
(4) If Qb≥ c, cQj/Qb≤ pj ≤ c+Qj −Qb, and pi≥ pj +Qi −Qj , then
0≤ θb= c
Qb
≤ θj = pj − c
Qj −Qb ≤ θi=1 ; (EC.15)
(5) If Qb≥ c, pj ≥ c+Qj −Qb, and pi≥ c+Qi −Qb, then
0≤ θb= c
Qb
≤ θj = θi=1 ; (EC.16)
(6) If pi≥ pj +Qi −Qj and either Qb≥ c and pj ≤ cQj/Qb, or Qb≤ c and pj ≤Qj hold, then
0≤ θb= θj = pj
Qj
≤ θi=1 ; (EC.17)
(7) If Qb≥ c and either cQj/Qb≤ pj ≤ c+Qj −Qb and cQi/Qb≤ pi≤ pj(Qi−Qb)−c(Qi−Qj)(Qi−Qb)−(Qi−Qj) , or pj ≥ c+
15Given eOo > 0 or e
O
c > 0, Qj >Qb is satisﬁed and Qi=Qj cannot be satisﬁed in equilibrium.
EC.4
Qj −Qb and cQi/Qb≤ pi≤ c+Qi −Qb, then
0≤ θb= c
Qb
≤ θj = θi= pi − c
Qi −Qb ≤ 1 ; (EC.18)
(8) If Qb≤ c, pj ≥Qj , and pi≥Qi, then
0≤ θb= θj = θi=1 . (EC.19)
Proof: For part (i), by (2), θ must satisfy
Qiθ − pi≥ max (Qjθ − pj , Qbθ − c, 0) (EC.20)
as a necessary condition for 1i(θ)= 1. Suppose that for some θˆ1< 1, we have 1i(θˆ1)= 1. By (EC.20),
we obtain Qiθˆ1 − pi≥ max(Qj θˆ1 − pj, Qbθˆ1 − c, 0). Using this fact, (EC.20), and since, by deﬁnition,
Qi≥Qj ≥Qb, it follows that 1i(θ)= 1 for all θˆ1≤ θ≤ 1. Therefore, there exists θi ∈Θ such that for all
θ∈Θ, 1i(θ)= 1 if and only if θ≥ θi. Similarly, by (2), a necessary condition for 1j(θ)= 1 is
Qjθ − pj ≥ max (Qiθ − pi, Qbθ − c, 0) . (EC.21)
Suppose that for some θˆ2<θi, we have 1j(θˆ2)= 1. By (EC.21), it follows that Qj θˆ2 − pj ≥ max(Qiθˆ2 −
pi, Qbθˆ2 − c, 0). Since Qj ≥Qb, by (EC.21), and by the characterization of θi, we obtain 1j(θ)= 1 for all
θˆ2≤ θ < θi. Therefore, there exists θj ∈Θ such that for all θ∈Θ, 1j(θ)= 1 if and only if θj ≤ θ < θi. If there
does not exist θˆ2<θi such that 1j(θˆ2)= 1, then, without loss of generality, we can set θj = θi. By (2), θ
must satisfy
Qbθ − c≥ max (Qiθ − pi, Qjθ − pj, 0) (EC.22)
as a necessary condition for 1b(θ)= 1. Suppose that for some θˆ3<θj, we have 1b(θˆ3)= 1. By (EC.22), we
obtain Qbθˆ3 − c≥ max(Qiθˆ3 − pi, Qj θˆ3 − pj, 0). Using this fact, (EC.22), and the characterizations of θi
and θj, it follows that 1b(θ)= 1 for all θˆ3≤ θ < θj. Therefore, there exists θb ∈Θ such that for all θ∈Θ,
1b(θ)= 1 if and only if θb≤ θ < θj. Similarly, if there does not exist θˆ3<θj such that 1b(θˆ3)= 1, then,
without loss of generality, we can set θb= θj . Finally, suppose θ < θb. By the characterization of θi, θj , and
θb, it follows that 1u(θ) = 0.
For part (ii), by the deﬁnition of Θ, and (EC.20), 1i(θ)= 1 if and only if
θ≥ tA min
(
max
(
pi
Qi
,
pi − pj
Qi −Qj ,
pi − c
Qi −Qb
)
, 1
)
. (EC.23)
Similarly, 1j(θ)= 1 if and only if
tB  max
(
pj
Qj
,
pj − c
Qj −Qb
)
≤ θ < tC  min
(
pi − pj
Qi −Qj , 1
)
. (EC.24)
EC.5
Finally, 1b(θ)= 1 if and only if
tD
c
Qb
≤ θ < tE  min
(
pj − c
Qj −Qb ,
pi − c
Qi −Qb , 1
)
, (EC.25)
and 1u(θ)= 0 if and only if
0≤ θ < tF  min
(
pi
Qi
,
pj
Qj
,
c
Qb
, 1
)
. (EC.26)
To see Region I, ﬁrst deﬁne
κA
pj(Qi −Qb)− c(Qi −Qj)
(Qi −Qb)− (Qi −Qj) . (EC.27)
By (EC.23), tA = (pi−pj)/(Qi−Qj)≤ 1 since pi≤ pj+Qi−Qj, pi≥κA implies (pi−pj)/(Qi−Qj)≥ (pi−
c)/(Qi −Qb), and pj ≥ cQj/Qb implies κA≥ pjQi/Qj which, in turn, implies (pi − pj)/(Qi −Qj)≥ pi/Qi.
It immediately follows that tC = tA. Further, pj ≥ cQj/Qb implies tB =(pj − c)/(Qj − Qb), and pi≥κA
implies tB ≤ tC . Because pj ≤ c + Qj − Qb and pi≥κA, it follows that tE = tB , and further, pj ≥ cQj/Qb
implies tD ≤ tE. Finally, tF = tD since Qb≥ c, which ﬁnishes the characterization presented in (EC.12).
The proofs of the remaining regions follow closely with that of Region I. 
Proof of Lemma 2: First, deﬁne τA( Q), τB( Q), and τC( Q) are deﬁned as follows:
τA( Q)
Qb(Qi −Qj)
4(Qi −Qb)− (Qj −Qb) , (EC.28)
τB( Q)
QbQj(Qi −Qj)
Qj(4Qi −Qj)−Qb(2Qi +Qj) , (EC.29)
and
τC( Q)
QiQj
2Qi −Qj . (EC.30)
Note that, it can be shown by algebraic manipulation that 0 ≤ τA( Q) ≤ τB( Q) ≤ Qj/2 ≤ τC( Q) as
stated in the statement of the lemma. By Lemma EC.3, if the conditions of Region IV, V, VI, or VIII
are satisﬁed, then, by (9) and (10), Π˘Oi (pi | pj)= 0. In each case, since Qi>c, there exists p> c such
that Π˘Oi (p | pj)≥ 0. Hence, none of these regions can occur in equilibrium. For Region VII, ﬁx any set
of parameters which satisfy the conditions, in which case, by Lemma EC.3, (9) and (10), Π˘Oj (pj | pi)= 0.
However, sinceQj >Qb≥ c, there exists c< p< cQj/Qb such that Π˘Oj (p | pi)≥ 0. Thus, ﬁrm j would deviate,
and this region cannot occur in equilibrium. Therefore, we can focus attention on Regions I, II, and III
for candidate equilibria.
For Region I, by (EC.12), (9) and (10), we obtain
Π˘Oi (pi | pj)= (pi − c)
(
1− pi − pj
Qi −Qj
)
(EC.31)
EC.6
and
Π˘Oj (pj | pi)= (pj − c)
(
pi − pj
Qi −Qj −
pj − c
Qj −Qb
)
. (EC.32)
Since Qi>Qj >Qb, by (EC.31) and (EC.32), both residual proﬁt functions are strictly concave, with
unconstrained maximizers characterized by
pi=
pj + c+Qi −Qj
2
(EC.33)
and
pj =
pi(Qj −Qb) + c((Qi −Qj) + (Qi −Qb))
2(Qi −Qb) . (EC.34)
Simultaneously solving (EC.33) and (EC.34) yields
pOi = c+
2(Qi −Qb)(Qi −Qj)
4(Qi −Qb)− (Qj −Qb) (EC.35)
and
pOj = c+
(Qj −Qb)(Qi −Qj)
4(Qi −Qb)− (Qj −Qb) . (EC.36)
By (EC.35), (EC.36), (EC.28), and the condition c≤ τA( Q), it follows that Qb≥ c, cQj/Qb≤ pOj ≤ c+Qj−
Qb, and (p
O
j (Qi −Qb)− c(Qi −Qj))/((Qi −Qb)− (Qi −Qj))≤ pOi ≤ pOj +Qi −Qj are satisﬁed. Therefore,
pOi and p
O
j are the unique candidate equilibrium prices of Region I of Lemma EC.3 when c≤ τA( Q). To
ensure that neither ﬁrm prefers to deviate its price to another region, ﬁrst ﬁx ﬁrm j’s price to pOj consider
the pricing of ﬁrm i. If it sets pi≤ cQi/Qb, then Region III applies and, by (EC.14), θi= pi/Qi. If ﬁrm
i sets cQi/Qb≤ pi≤ (pOj (Qi − Qb) − c(Qi − Qj))/((Qi − Qb) − (Qi − Qj)), then Region VII of Lemma
EC.3 applies and, by (EC.18), θi=(pi − c)/(Qi −Qb). If it sets (pOj (Qi −Qb)− c(Qi −Qj))/((Qi −Qb)−
(Qi −Qj))≤ pi≤ pOj +Qi −Qj , then Region I applies and, by (EC.12), θi=(pi − pj)/(Qi −Qj). Finally,
if pi≥ pOj +Qi −Qj, then Region IV applies and, by (EC.15), θi=1. In summary, ﬁrm i’s proﬁt function
is given by
Π˘Oi (pi | pOj )=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(pi − c)
(
1− piQi
)
if pi≤ cQiQb ;
(pi − c)
(
1− pi−cQi−Qb
)
if cQiQb ≤ pi≤
pOj (Qi−Qb)−c(Qi−Qj)
Qj−Qb ;
(pi − c)
(
1− pi−p
O
j
Qi−Qj
)
if
pOj (Qi−Qb)−c(Qi−Qj)
Qj−Qb ≤ pi≤ pOj +Qi −Qj ;
0 if pi≥ pOj +Qi −Qj .
(EC.37)
By (EC.37), Π˘Oi (· | pOj ) is continuous. Further, it is increasing on [0, cQi/Qb] if and only if pi≤ (Qi +
c)/2, which is satisﬁed since c≤ τA( Q) implies cQi/Qb≤ (Qi + c)/2. Also, Π˘Oi (· | pOj ) is increasing on
[cQi/Qb, (p
O
j (Qi −Qb) − c(Qi −Qj))/((Qi −Qb)− (Qi −Qj))] if an only if pi≤ c + (Qi −Qb)/2 which is
satisﬁed since (pOj (Qi −Qb)− c(Qi −Qj))/((Qi −Qb)− (Qi −Qj))≤ c+ (Qi −Qb)/2. Therefore, pi given
in (EC.35) maximizes (EC.37).
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Similarly, we ﬁx ﬁrm i’s price to pOi and examine ﬁrm j’s price setting problem. Since p
O
i − (Qi −
Qj)≤ cQj/Qb when c≤ τA( Q), by Region VI and (EC.17), if pj ≤ pOi − (Qi −Qj), then θj = pj/Qj . Since
pOi ≥ pjQi/Qb when pOi −(Qi−Qj)≤ pj ≤ cQj/Qb, Region II applies and, by (EC.13), we obtain θj = pj/Qj
and θi=(p
O
i − pj)/(Qi −Qj). If cQj/Qb≤ pj ≤ c+Qj −Qb, then all conditions of Region I are satisﬁed as
shown above, in which case θj =(pj−c)/(Qj−Qb) and θi=(pOi −pj)/(Qi−Qj). Finally, if pj ≥ c+Qj−Qb,
then cQi/Qb≤ pOi ≤ c+Qi−Qb, and hence, Region VII applies and, by (EC.18), θj = θi. In summary, ﬁrm
j’s proﬁt function is given by
Π˘Oj (pj | pOi )=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(pj − c)
(
1− pjQj
)
if pj ≤ pOi − (Qi −Qj) ;
(pi − c)
(
pOi −pj
Qi−Qj −
pj
Qj
)
if pOi − (Qi −Qj)≤ pj ≤ cQjQb ;
(pi − c)
(
pOi −pj
Qi−Qj −
pj−c
Qj−Qb
)
if
cQj
Qb
≤ pj ≤ c+Qj −Qb ;
0 if pj ≥ c+Qj −Qb .
(EC.38)
By (EC.38), Π˘Oj (· | pOi ) is continuous. Further, it is increasing on [0, pOi −(Qi−Qj)] if and only if pj ≤ (Qj+
c)/2, which is satisﬁed since c≤ τA( Q) implies pOi − (Qi −Qj)≤ (Qj + c)/2. Also, Π˘Oj (· | pOi ) is increasing
on [pOi − (Qi −Qj), cQj/Qb] if an only if pj ≤ (cQi + pOi Qj)/(2Qi) which is satisﬁed since cQj/Qb≤ (cQi +
pOi Qj)/(2Qi). Therefore, pj given in (EC.36) maximizes (EC.38). This completes the proof of part (i).
Moreover, we can prove parts (ii) through (v) using the analysis similar to that applied for part (i).
This analysis is omitted for brevity. 
Proof of Proposition 1: Consider a strong contributor regime with small βc=1/z. We ﬁrst investigate
the behavior of eOc and e
O
o as z → ∞. Deﬁne k, p ∈ IR as
lim
z→∞
eOc
zp
= K1 , and lim
z→∞
eOo
zk
= K2 , (EC.39)
where K1, K2 ∈ IR are constants, i.e., as z → ∞, eOc is in the order of zp, or in standard notation, O(zp),
and eOo is in the order or z
k, or equivalently, O(zk). Since Qo = goe
O
o + gce
O
c + s
O
ooe
O
o + s
O
oce
O
c , it follows
that Qo is in the order of z
max(k, p). Similarly, Qc = goe
O
o + gce
O
c + s
O
coe
O
o + s
O
cce
O
c is in the order of z
max(k, p),
and Qb = goe
O
o + gce
O
c is in the order of z
max(k, p).
First, let k > 0. Suppose that k≥ p. In this case, max(k, p)= k, hence Qo is at most in the order of
zk. Moreover, the maximum possible price pOo for the service of the originator which can generate strictly
positive demand is Qo and the potential maximum demand is one. Consequently, Π˘
O
o is at most in the order
of zk. The originator’s eﬀort cost Co(e
O
o ) = βo(e
O
o )
2/2 is in the order of z2k. To guarantee non-negative
proﬁt for the originator, k≥ 2k should be satisﬁed, but it cannot be for k > 0, leading to a contradiction.
Therefore, if k > 0, then p>k.
Second, let k≤ 0. Suppose that p≤ 0. Then, Qc is in the order of zmax(k,p) which is bounded by O(1)
because max(k, p)≤ 0. However, the selection of p = 1/2 implies that Π˘Oc is in the order of z1/2 whereas
Cc(e
O
c ) is in the order of z
2p−1 = z0. Thus, the contributor would proﬁtably deviate by choosing p = 1/2
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which is a contradiction. Therefore, if k≤ 0, then p> 0.
Summarizing, p> max(0, k). Because Qc −Qo is in the order of zp, Qo −Qb is in the order of zp, and
Qc −Qb is in the order of zp, by (EC.28), τA is in the order of zp. Thus, Region I of Lemma 2 applies for
suﬃciently large z. The contributor’s proﬁt is given as
ΠOc (e
O
c | eOo ) =
2(Qc −Qb)(Qc −Qo)
4(Qc −Qb)− (Qo −Qb) ·
(
1− 2(Qc −Qb)− (Qo −Qb)
4(Qc −Qb)− (Qo −Qb)
)
− Cc(eOc ) . (EC.40)
Substituting for Qb, Qo, and Qc, and diﬀerentiating (EC.40) twice with respect to e
O
c , and then plugging
in eOc = O(z
p) and eOo = O(z
k), we ﬁnd that the second order condition is satisﬁed, i.e., d2ΠOc /d(e
O
c )
2< 0
for all eOc > 0. Next, plugging e
O
c in the order z
p and eOo in the order z
k into the ﬁrst order condition of
eOc , and collecting the terms in powers of z, we obtain the following:
D1z
p−1 +D2 + Y1(z) = 0 , (EC.41)
where D1, D2 ∈ IR, and Y1(z) is polynomial in z, with order lower than max(p− 1, 0). Because as z → ∞,
(EC.41) should hold for all z, p− 1 = 0, i.e., p = 1 should be satisﬁed.
Next, for the originator’s eﬀort problem, the originator’s proﬁt is written as
ΠOo (e
O
o ) =
(Qo −Qb)(Qc −Qo)(Qc −Qb)
(4(Qc −Qb)− (Qo −Qb))2 − Co(e
O
o ) , (EC.42)
where Qo = goe
O
o + gce
O
c (e
O
o ) + s
O
ooe
O
o + s
O
oce
O
c (e
O
o ), Qc = goe
O
o + gce
O
c (e
O
o ) + s
O
coe
O
o + s
O
cce
O
c (e
O
o ), and Qb =
goe
O
o + gce
O
c (e
O
o ). Note that e
O
c (e
O
o ) is obtained from the ﬁrst order condition of e
O
c above, and by the
implicit function theorem, we also obtain
deOc (e
O
o )
deOo
= −
∂2
∂eOc ∂e
O
o
Π˘Oc (e
O
c |eOo )
∂2
∂(eOc )
2 Π˘Oc (e
O
c |eOo )− βc
. (EC.43)
Using (EC.43), and taking a total derivative of (EC.42) with respect to eOo , and ﬁnally substituting the
functional form of eOc = E1/z +O(1) and that e
O
o is in the order of z
k, we obtain
G1 +G2z
k + Y2(z) = 0 , (EC.44)
for constants G1, G2 ∈ IR and a polynomial term Y2(z) whose order is less than a constant. Therefore, the
highest order term of eOo is a constant term, i.e., k = 0. Finally, by taking another total derivative of
dΠOo (e
O
o )/de
O
o with respective to e
O
o , we conﬁrm that the second order condition is satisﬁed in this case,
i.e., d2ΠOo /d(e
O
o )
2 ≤ 0.
Based on these two values, p=1 and k=0, substituting the resulting functional forms of eOc and e
O
o into
two ﬁrst order conditions and equating the lead coeﬃcients of the highest order terms with respect to z to
zero, similar to the methodology in August et al. (2014), we obtain the following optimal eﬀort investment
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levels:
eOc =
4(sOcc − sOoc)(sOcc)2
λ21βc
+
(eOo )
2(sOoc + 5s
O
cc)(s
O
ocs
O
co − sOoosOcc)2
4(sOoc − sOcc)2(sOcc)4
· βc +O
(
β2c
)
, (EC.45)
where λ1=4s
O
cc − sOoc, and
eOo =
λ2
βoλ31
+O (βc) , (EC.46)
where λ2=(s
O
oc)
3sOco + 2(s
O
oc)
2sOcos
O
cc − 7sOoosOoc(sOcc)2 + 4sOoo(sOcc)3. Plugging the equilibrium eﬀort levels in
(EC.45) and (EC.46) into the quality expressions, we obtain that
Qc −Qo = 4(s
O
cc − sOoc)2(sOcc)2
λ21βc
− λ2(s
O
oo − sOco)
βoλ31
+O (βc) , (EC.47)
which is decreasing in sOoc. Furthermore, from (EC.42), (EC.45), and (EC.46), it then follows that
ΠOo (e
O
o )=
4sOoc(s
O
cc)
3(sOoc − sOcc)2
βcλ
4
1
+
λ22
2βoλ
6
1
+O (βc) . (EC.48)
From ΠOo (e
O
o ) given in (EC.48), the coeﬃcient of the leading term with 1/βc is 4s
O
oc(s
O
cc)
3(sOcc−sOoc)2/(4sOcc−
sOoc)
3. Taking derivative with respect to sOoc, we obtain
∂
∂sOoc
(
4sOoc(s
O
cc)
3(sOcc − sOoc)2
(4sOcc − sOoc)3
)
= −4(s
O
cc)
3(sOcc − sOoc)((sOoc)2 + sOcc(9sOoc − 4sOcc))
(4sOcc − sOoc)5
. (EC.49)
Note that (EC.49) is negative if 4sOcc/9<s
O
oc<s
O
cc. Hence in this case, Π
O
o (e
O
o ) decreases in s
O
oc. In the same
regime, it follows that
lim
βc→0
βcW
O
A
=κ1 , (EC.50)
for some constant κ1> 0, where
A =
2(sOcc − sOoc)(sOcc)2(gc(4sOcc − sOoc)2 + sOcc(8(sOcc)2 + 3sOocsOcc − 2(sOoc)2))
(4sOcc − sOoc)4
. (EC.51)
We then obtain
∂A
∂sOoc
= −2(s
O
cc)
2(gc(4s
O
cc − sOoc)2(2sOcc + sOoc)− sOcc(12(sOcc)3 − 55sOoc(sOcc)2 + 14(sOoc)2sOcc + 2(sOoc)3))
(4sOcc − sOoc)5
.
(EC.52)
Note that under the condition of 4sOcc/9<s
O
oc<s
O
cc, it follows that 12(s
O
cc)
3 − 55sOoc(sOcc)2 + 14(sOoc)2sOcc +
2(sOoc)
3 < 0. As a result, we obtain ∂A/∂sOoc < 0, which implies that a less restrictive policy increases social
welfare.
For part (ii) about consumer surplus, using the derived equilibrium eﬀort levels in (EC.45) and (EC.46),
and plugging the equilibrium prices given in (11) into consumer surplus expression in (15), we similarly
obtain
lim
βc→0
βcCS
O
B
=κ2 , (EC.53)
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for some constant κ2 > 0, where
B =
2(sOcc − sOoc)(sOcc)2(gc(4sOcc − sOoc)2 + (sOcc)2(5sOoc + 4sOcc))
(4sOcc − sOoc)4
. (EC.54)
After taking a derivative of B with respect to sOoc, it follows that
∂B
∂sOoc
= −2(s
O
cc)
2(gc(4s
O
cc − sOoc)2(2sOcc + sOoc)− (sOcc)2(20(sOcc)2 − 37sOccsOoc − 10(sOoc)2))
(4sOcc − sOoc)5
. (EC.55)
Note that 20(sOcc)
2 − 37sOccsOoc − 10(sOoc)2 > 0 if and only if sOoc< 40s
O
cc
37+
√
2169
. Hence, if gc < γ, where
γ = max
(
(sOcc)
2(20(sOcc)
2 − 37sOccsOoc − 10(sOoc)2)
(4sOcc − sOoc)2(2sOcc + sOoc)
, 0
)
, (EC.56)
then ∂B/∂sOoc > 0, which implies that a less restrictive license decreases consumer surplus. Otherwise, i.e.,
if gc≥ γ, a less restrictive license increases consumer surplus. 
Proof of Proposition 2: First, for suﬃciently small βc and s
O
oc>s
O
cc, there exists a range of c, such that
Qo>Qc>Qb and τB( Q)<c≤Qc/2 are satisﬁed. By Lemma 2, pOo and pOc satisfy (13). Hence, by part
(ii) of Lemma EC.3, we obtain
ΠOc (ec | eo) =
Qo(Qo −Qc)(Qc − 2c)2
Qc(Qc − 4Qo)2 − Cc(e
O
c ) . (EC.57)
Let eˆc denote the interior optimizer of (EC.57). Then, by (EC.57),
AQo(Qo −Qc)D2 + (B(Qc − 2c) + 2(gc + sOcc)(Qo −Qc)Qo)D − βceˆc=0 , (EC.58)
where
A= (gc + s
O
cc)(Qc − 4Qo)2 + 2Qc(Qc − 4Qo)(sOcc − 4sOoc − 3gc) , (EC.59)
B=(Qo −Qc)(gc + sOoc) +Qo(sOoc − sOcc) , (EC.60)
and
D=
Qc − 2c
Qc(Qc − 4Qo)2 . (EC.61)
Now, suppose c=K/βc for some K> 0. It then follows, by (EC.58), that limβc→0 eˆcβc/γ=κ, for some
κ> 0. Substituting for c, eˆc, Qo, Qc, A and B into (EC.58), we have
γ = sup
{
γˆ > 0 | 4K2(gc + sOoc)(sOoc − sOcc)− γˆ2(gc + sOoc)(sOoc − sOcc)(gc + sOcc)2
+ γˆ3(gc + s
O
cc)(3gc + 4s
O
oc − sOcc)2=0
}
.
(EC.62)
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Again, substituting into (EC.57), we obtain
lim
βc→0
ΠOc (eˆc | eOo ) ·
(
τ1 + τ2
βcτ3
)−1
= κa , (EC.63)
for some κa> 0, where
τ1=8K
2(gc + s
O
oc)(s
O
oc − sOcc)− 8Kγ(gc + sOoc)(sOoc − sOcc)(gc + sOcc), (EC.64)
τ2=2γ
2(gc + s
O
oc)(s
O
oc − sOcc)(gc + sOcc)2 − γ3(gc + sOcc)(3gc + 4sOoc − sOcc)2, (EC.65)
and
τ3=2γ(gc + s
O
cc)(3gc + 4s
O
oc − sOcc)2 . (EC.66)
If τ =(τ1 + τ2)/τ3> 0 then e
O
c = eˆc, and hence, by (EC.29), we obtain
lim
βc→0
τB( Q) ·
(
γgc(s
O
oc − sOcc)(gc + sOcc)
(sOcc(4s
O
oc − sOcc) + gc(2sOoc + sOcc))βc
)−1
=κb , (EC.67)
and
lim
βc→0
Qc
(
γ(gc + s
O
cc)
βc
)−1
=κc , (EC.68)
for some κb> 0 and κc> 0. By (EC.67), c> τB( Q) is satisﬁed whenever γ <K(s
O
cc(4s
O
oc − sOcc) + gc(2sOoc +
sOcc))/(gc(s
O
oc − sOcc)(gc + sOcc)) which, by (EC.62), is satisﬁed when
K>K = max
(
sOcc(4s
O
oc − sOcc)(gc + sOcc)τ6
τ4τ35
,
2τ6
3τ24 τ5
)
, (EC.69)
where τ4=3gc + 4s
O
oc − sOcc, τ5= sOcc(4sOoc − sOcc) + gc(2sOoc + sOcc) and τ6= gc(gc + sOoc)(sOoc − sOcc)2(gc + sOcc)2.
By equations (EC.62)-(EC.66), the critical value of K such that τ =0 is given by
Kˆ =
4(gc + s
O
oc)(s
O
oc − sOcc)(gc + sOcc)2
27(3gc + 4sOoc − sOcc)2
. (EC.70)
Further, again by (EC.62)-(EC.66),
dτ
dK
=
∂τ
∂K
+
∂τ
∂γ
· dγ
dK
=
4(gc + s
O
oc)(s
O
oc − sOcc)(2K − γ(gc + sOcc))
γ(gc + sOcc)(3gc + 4s
O
oc − sOcc)2
< 0 (EC.71)
is satisﬁed for γ > 2K/(gc + s
O
cc) which holds when K<K˜ where
K˜=
(gc + s
O
oc)(s
O
oc − sOcc)(gc + sOcc)2√
27(3gc + 4sOoc − sOcc)2
. (EC.72)
Since K<Kˆ is satisﬁed when 7gcs
O
cc+4s
O
ocs
O
cc> 4gcs
O
oc+(s
O
cc)
2 and c≤Qc/2 is satisﬁed when γ > 2K/(gc+
sOcc), by (EC.70) and (EC.72), we obtain K<Kˆ < K˜ such that τB( Q)<c≤Qc/2 and τ < 0 are satisﬁed for
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all K ∈ (Kˆ, K˜). By (EC.62) and τ =(τ1 + τ2)/τ3, we obtain
dτ
dsOoc
=
∂τ
∂sOoc
+
∂τ
∂γ
· dγ
dsOoc
=
(3gc + 2s
O
oc + s
O
cc)(2K − γ(gc + sOcc))2
γ(3gc + 4sOoc − sOcc)3
> 0 , (EC.73)
hence there exist parameter values sOoc< s¯
O
oc and an interval SK ⊂ (Kˆ, K˜) such that if K ∈SK , then τ < 0
under sOoc and τ > 0 under s¯
O
oc. Since τ < 0 implies e
O
c =0 which implies ρ
∗=P , and since c=K/βc, it then
follows that |Qo−Qc|, ΠOo , CSO andWO under s¯Ooc are larger than |Qo−Qc|, ΠPo , CSP andWP under sOoc. 
B. The Analysis for the Case where the Contributor is not Profit Seeking
In this section, we examine a case where the contributor has an altruistic motivation as opposed to a proﬁt-
seeking motivation associated with the services market. The sequence in the timeline remains similar to
the primary model employed in the paper. First, the originator chooses a source code strategy: proprietary
or open-source. Second, the originator determines her eﬀort investment eo to increase the quality of her
software oﬀering. Third, the altruistic contributor’s eﬀort ec is modeled as a random shock, uniformly
distributed over the support [ec, e¯c], and realized in this period. Fourth, after all development eﬀorts
have been observed, the originator sets price(s). If the originator employed a proprietary strategy, then it
sets both its software price pP and the price for its services pPo . However, if the originator employed an
open-source strategy, then it sets only the price for its services pOo . Having only an altruistic motivation,
the contributor does not compete in the market for services. Fifth and ﬁnally, consumers decide whether
to use/purchase (OSS/proprietary) the software and, if so, whether to contract with the originator or
the competitive integrator for services. To be consistent with analyses provided in the main body, we
focus on the strong contributor regime. Speciﬁcally, we assume that ec > max
(
2c
gc
, go(go+2s
O
oo)−8βoc
8βosOoc
)
and
βo < (go + s
P
oo)
2/(6
√
3c).
Under an OSS strategy and the suﬃcient condition, ec > 2c/gc, the originator’s proﬁt is given by
ΠOo =
⎧⎨
⎩
(pOo − c)
(
1− pOo −c
QOo −QOb
)
− βo(eOo )22 if pOo ≥ Q
O
o c
QOb
;
(pOo − c)
(
1− pOo
QOo
)
− βo(eOo )22 if pOo < Q
O
o c
QOb
.
(EC.74)
Maximizing (EC.74) with respect to pOo , we obtain p
O
o = c + (Q
O
o − QOb )/2, where QOo = goeOo + gcec +
sOooe
O
o + s
O
ocec and Q
O
b = goe
O
o + gcec. This price, p
O
o , corresponds to the interior optimal price for the ﬁrst
case in (EC.74), i.e., pOo ≥ QOo c/QOb . In this case, the originator’s expected proﬁts are given by
ΠOo =
sOooe
O
o + s
O
ocE[ec]
4
− βo(e
O
o )
2
2
. (EC.75)
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Maximizing (EC.75) over eOo , the optimal eﬀort of the originator is given by e
O,∗
o = sOoo/(4βo), and its
optimal expected proﬁt can be written as
ΠO,∗o =
(sOoo)
2
32βo
+
E[ec]
4
sOoc , (EC.76)
noting that ΠO,∗o in (EC.76) is continuously increasing in sOoc. Expected social welfare can be simpliﬁed to
WO = E
[
go(s
O
oo)
2(2go + s
O
oo) + 32β
2
o (gcec − c)2 + 4βcsOoo(gc(go + sOoo)ec − 4cgo)
16βo(4βogcec + gosOoo)
]
+
3E[ec]
8
sOoc . (EC.77)
Similar to the originator’s expected proﬁt, WO is also continuously increasing in sOoc. Expected consumer
surplus is written as
CSO = E
[
go(s
O
oo)
2(4go + s
O
oo) + 64β
2
o (gcec − c)2 + 4βcsOoo(gc(8go + sOoo)ec − 8cgo)
32βo(4βogcec + gosOoo)
]
+
E[ec]
8
sOoc , (EC.78)
which is also linearly increasing in sOoc.
Next, under a proprietary strategy and the suﬃcient condition provided above, the originator’s pricing
problem can be expressed
max
pP , pPo
ΠPo (p
P , pPo | ePo , ec)= pP
∫
Θ 1u(θ)dθ +
(
pPo − c
) ∫
Θ 1o(θ)dθ − 12βo(ePo )2 , (EC.79)
where 1 is the indicator function, and
∫
Θ 1u(θ)dθ and
∫
Θ 1o(θ)dθ correspond to the total demand for the
software and the total demand for the originator’s services, respectively. Even with the presence of the
competitive integrator, one can establish that the originator obtains monopoly proﬁts. Speciﬁcally, as long
as Qo > c, the originator can set p
P
o = c and p
P = (Qo − c)/2, pushing the competitive integrator out of
the market and achieving monopoly proﬁts, which can be written as
ΠPo =
(Qo − c)2
4Qo
− 1
2
βo(e
P
o )
2 , (EC.80)
where Qo = (go + s
P
oo)e
P
o . Note that if Qo ≤ c, ΠPo = −12βo(ePo )2 ≤ 0. The ﬁrst order condition for the
maximization of the originator’s proﬁt in (EC.80) with respect to ePo can be simpliﬁed to
−(go + sPoo)(ePo )2(4βoePo − (go + sPoo))− c2 = 0 . (EC.81)
Under the suﬃcient condition of βo < (go+s
P
oo)
2/(6
√
3c), the ﬁrst order condition (EC.81) has two positive
solutions, among which the larger one is the unique local maximizer. Consequently, for the proprietary case,
eP,∗o is either 0 or the larger positive solution of (EC.81). In other words, if the larger positive solution of
(EC.81) leads to positive proﬁt in (EC.80), it becomes the optimal eﬀort level of the originator. Otherwise,
the originator does not invest in quality improvement. Under the suﬃcient condition, ec >
go(go+2sOoo)−8βoc
8βosOoc
,
EC.14
the upper bound of (EC.80), Qo−c4 − 12βo(ePo )2, is less than (EC.76). As a result, in the strong contributor
regime, it is optimal for the originator to choose an open source strategy for this case of an altruistic
contributor.
EC.15
